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In an effort to improve outcomes in the civil and healthcare sectors, clients have
adopted collaborative project delivery methods for the delivery of their capital
projects. The success stories in these sectors have gathered the attention of clients in
the industrial sector, where cost and schedule overruns have become the norm. The
central objective of this thesis is to help clients make the transition to this new type of
project delivery.
This thesis was written in a three-paper format, where each paper addresses a
challenge with the adoption of collaborative delivery methods. The first paper
investigates what type of industrial project would be a good candidate for
collaborative delivery. Through seven semi-structured interviews and a web-based
questionnaire with 49 responses, this paper reveals that risk/uncertainty is the primary
driver for using a collaborative delivery method. In contrast to current guidelines,
complexity was not found to be an important motivator for using this alternative
delivery method. Evidence was also found to suggest that projects with higher dollar
value are more suitable for collaborative delivery methods.
The second paper explores lessons learned about the shared risk/reward commercial
terms. Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore what practitioners
in New Zealand and Australia have learned regarding these commercial terms. The

interviews revealed five important lessons that will help clients in the industrial sector
understand and implement these new legal instruments.
The third paper in this thesis develops a framework to compare the performance of a
project delivered collaboratively with one that is delivered under a traditional
approach. A three-hour long research charrette with 12 industry professionals was
used to develop the Project Success Framework. The framework consists of 11 Key
Result Areas that clients should use to compare project performance. This framework
will help clients determine if collaborative delivery methods are able to produce as
successful outcomes in the industrial sector as they have in the civil and healthcare
sectors.
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1.
1.1

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
The Current State

Like the rest of the construction industry, the industrial sector has been plagued with
the underperformance of its capital projects. In 2014, Ernst and Young conducted a
study of 365 oil and gas megaprojects and found that 64% of these projects
experienced cost overruns, and 73% experienced schedule overruns (Ernst and
Young, 2014). In another study, Edward Merrow (2012) found that 65% of the 300
industrial megaprojects investigated failed to meet their business objectives.
The problem of underperformance is not unique to the industrial sector; there are a
plethora of articles and investigations that have raised concerns about the success of
the entire construction industry. In 2015, KPMG conducted a global survey of
construction clients across a wide variety of construction sectors. They found that
over 61% of clients had experienced one or more underperforming projects in the past
financial year (KPMG, 2015). In a study by McKinsey and Company, they claim
“construction has suffered for decades from remarkably poor productivity”
(McKinsey & Company, 2017). Another study by McKinsey and Company found that
98% of megaprojects suffer cost overruns of more than 30%, and 77% are at least
40% late (Changali et al., 2015).
In response to the concerning performance of the construction industry, a task force
led by Sir John Egan was charged with identifying opportunities that could lead to
improved efficiency and quality (Egan, 1998). Egan’s landmark report provided the
construction industry with several recommendations on how the current situation
could be improved. Egan’s team placed significant emphasis on the need to integrate
the entire construction process, stating, “The efficiency of project delivery is presently
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constrained by the largely separated processes through which they are generally
planned, designed and constructed” (Egan, 1998). Egan also explains that the
sequential nature of the conventional construction process is currently acting as a
barrier to incorporating the knowledge of constructors in the design and planning
stages of projects. Latham (1994) and Farmer (2016) both reinforce Egan’s
proposition that the conventional construction process is playing a significant role in
the problems with the delivery of capital projects.
1.2

Problems with Traditional Delivery Methods

Egan’s criticisms of the conventional project delivery process generated significant
interest in understanding why the conventional delivery process results in poor project
outcomes. Before these problems are explored, definition of the conventional project
delivery process is provided.
The conventional project delivery process is how most clients, suppliers, contractors,
and designers engage in business. It is also known as the traditional approach, the
design-bid-build (DBB) project delivery method, or the segregated services model
(DBIA, 2015; Jackson, 2011). Under the traditional model, the client executes and
manages two separate contracts for the design and construction services of their
project. The designer and contractor have no legal obligation to communicate, and the
client becomes the filter, or mediator, between the two parties. Figure 1-1 shows the
contractual structure of the DBB model.
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Figure 1-1. Design-bid-build project delivery method contractual structure (DBIA,
2015).
The DBB delivery method is often referred to as a linear delivery method because the
different phases of the project execute in a linear fashion; that is, all of the design is
completed before any construction begins. Figure 1-1 also shows this sequential
nature.
The traditional delivery method has two frequently cited flaws: (1) it creates a
misalignment of interests between clients and their service providers, and (2) it
creates a fragmented and adversarial working environment (ADIRD, 2015; DTF
Victoria, 2006; Hayford, 2018; Ross, 2003). A detailed review of why the traditional
delivery process creates these problems is explored in the following sections.
1.2.1 Misalignment of Financial and Non-Financial Interests
With any enterprise, it is in a client’s best interest to purchase the best possible service
for the lowest price (ADIRD, 2015). Therefore, when a client undertakes any
enterprise, they have two primary interests: their non-financial interests, which relate
to the product or service meeting their functional needs; and their financial interests,
relating to the cost of the product or service. Jackson (2011) explains that when a

4
client purchases construction services, “incentives are always part of the contract,
whether they are explicit or not”, and several authors have identified that the implicit
incentives generated by the traditional contracts do not match the two primary
interests of the client (Fischer et al., 2017; Hayford, 2018). The section below
provides a brief overview of how traditional contracts create a misalignment between
the interests of the service providers and their clients.
The two traditional commercial agreements for purchasing construction services are
through a lump sum or cost plus agreement. A range of variations to these agreements
exist, including unit priced agreements, cost plus with a guaranteed maximum price
(GMP), and different fee structures for the cost plus agreements. Although there are a
wide range of variations, each one contains similar incentives. The lump sum and cost
plus commercial agreements are defined as:
Lump Sum:
Under a lump sum commercial agreement, the contractor is paid a fixed
price for the agreed scope of work, irrespective of the actual project
costs (Ferreira & Rogerson, 1999).
Cost Plus:
Under a cost plus commercial agreement, the contractor is compensated
for all of their construction related costs, plus an amount to cover their
corporate overheads and profit (Ferreira & Rogerson, 1999).
With a lump sum agreement, it is in the best interest of a service provider to minimize
their costs while meeting the minimum conditions of satisfaction of their client
(Jackson, 2011). So, while the financial interests are aligned under this model, the
non-financial interests of the client and the service provider work in opposing
directions. The client must therefore accept the risk that the final product will not
meet their functional or quality requirements.
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With a cost plus agreement, it is in the best interest of a supplier to maximize their
costs as this will increase their absolute profit (Ferreira & Rogerson, 1999). Under
this agreement, there is alignment of the project’s non-financial interests, as higher
quality products will lead to higher project cost and thus profit, but a misalignment of
the financial interests because the service provider has no incentive to control project
costs. Under this agreement, the client must accept the risk that the project cost will
be uncontrolled.
Neither of these commercial terms enable a client to align their service providers’
interests with both their financial and non-financial interests. Figure 1-2 provides a
graphical representation of this misalignment.

Yes

Alignment

No

Lump
Sum

Cost
Plus

Non-Financial Outcomes

Financial Outcomes

Figure 1-2. Misalignment of interests between clients and their service providers on
traditional agreements.
1.2.2 Fragmentation and Adversarial Nature
Another frequent criticism of the traditional contractual models is that they cause a
fragmented and adversarial environment. Hayford (2018) explains that under the
traditional model, a project effectively becomes the collection of sub projects: where
the client has an agreement with the architect/engineer for the design, a separate
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agreement with a prime contractor for the construction, and the prime contractor has
separate agreements with multiple subcontractors for separate scopes of work. Under
this model, each service provider and their respective subcontractors are compensated
for their individual scopes of work. The result is that each participant has a strong
financial incentive to perform their individual responsibilities well, and little financial
incentive to consider how their segment of work influences the overall performance of
the project (Thomsen et al., 2016). Evidently, the interests within a single project
become fragmented among each of the service providers. The client, however, has no
interest in the performance of any one system or piece of equipment. Thomsen et. al
(2016) gives a tangible example of how compensating service providers for their
individual work, rather than the overall project, can cause the overall project to suffer:
“Imagine a scenario where the design of the HVAC system is
running over budget, but the plumbing design consultant realizes
there is a way to revise the plumbing designs that would be cost
effective and also allow the HVAC system to be rerouted in a more
efficient way. If the plumbing design consultant is running up
against its budgeted hours for the design development phase when it
realizes this solution, and the HVAC system as currently designed
does not hurt the plumbing designer at all, the economic incentive is
for the plumbing designer to keep his head down and remain silent”
(Thomsen et. al, 2016)
To further the issue, when problems arise, which they inevitably do, it is in each
individual’s best commercial interest to demonstrate that another party was
responsible for the problem and should be liable for its financial repercussions
(Hayford, 2018). Under the traditional commercial models, it is better for project
participants to find someone else to blame for a problem rather than collectively
searching for a solution. In extreme cases, parties are incentivized to search for the
mistakes of others so that they can cover up their own shortcomings. Encouraging
service providers to point blame rather than problem solve is why the traditional
contractual agreements have been titled “inherently adversarial” (Hayford, 2018).
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1.3

Collaborative Delivery Methods

In response to the underperformance of large capital projects in the civil sector,
government agencies in New Zealand and Australia adopted an alternative form of
project delivery known as Project Alliancing (alliancing). The Australian Department
of Infrastructure Regional Development define alliancing as “A delivery model where
the owner(s), contractor(s), and consultant(s) work collaboratively as an integrated
team and their commercial interests are aligned with actual project outcomes”
(ADIRD, 2015). Gransberg et al. (2015) point out that alliancing is not to be
misconstrued as the Australian term for the U.S. version of partnering.
In 2004, the healthcare sector in the United States adopted a variant of the Australian
alliance known as “Integrated Project Delivery” (IPD). The American Institute of
Architects defines IPD as “a project delivery approach that integrates people, systems,
business structures and practices into a process that collaboratively harnesses the
talents and insights of all participants to optimize project results, increase value to the
owner, reduce waste, and maximize efficiency through all phases of design,
fabrication, and construction” (AIA, 2007).
In comparison to the separate contracts required to deliver a project under a traditional
delivery method, both alliancing and IPD delivery methods consist of a single multiparty agreement between the primary project participants, as shown in Figure 1-3.
Delivery methods that contain this multi-party agreement have often been referred to
as “collaborative project delivery methods” (Engebø et al., 2020; Lahdenperä, 2012).
For the remainder of this thesis, both the alliancing and IPD delivery methods will
jointly be referred to as collaborative project delivery methods. Other terms that have
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been used to describe these delivery methods include, relational project delivery
methods, relational contracts, and alternative delivery methods.
The Australian Department of Infrastructure Regional Development explain that the
most significant difference between traditional delivery methods and a collaborative
delivery method is the risk distribution (ADIRD, 2015). Traditional delivery methods
are founded on the Abrahamson principle that risk should be allocated to the party
best able to manage it. In contrast, collaborative delivery methods create a situation
where each of the primary project participants collectively share the in the outcomes
of the project (ADIRD, 2015).

Figure 1-3. Multi-party agreement used on collaborative delivery methods.
Some authors have included project partnering under the umbrella of collaborative
project delivery methods (Engebø et al., 2020; Lahdenperä, 2012). Others such as
Gransberg et al. (2015) and Beckman-Cross (2016) have discussed that partnering
should be separated from these delivery methods primarily because the risk
distribution is different between partnering and IPD/alliancing. Under a partnering
agreement it is possible for one organization may make profit while other
organizations incur a financial loss. Under collaborative agreements, the financial

9
outcomes of the project are collectively shared by all of the participants. Because this
distinction exists, partnering was excluded from this studies definition of a
collaborative project delivery method.
1.4

Research Needs

In the civil and healthcare sectors of New Zealand, Australia, and the United States,
collaborative delivery methods are now mature systems for delivering capital projects.
Research has documented consistent success of these alternative approaches (Cheng,
2012; Cohen, 2010; Gransberg & Jeong, 2019; Ross, 2000), begging the question:
why are collaborative project delivery methods not being used in the industrial sector?
This is the question that the Construction Industry Institute (CII) charged two research
teams with exploring. CII is a center for research and development of capital projects
with an emphasis in the heavy industrial sector. CII commissioned research team RT271 with exploring the following question: “if the capital project delivery industry did
not exist and a new need was created for it, what would it look like?” (CII RT-271,
2012). One of the suggestions RT-271 made was that the ideal delivery system would
have collaborative financial management, or more specifically, there would be
alignment on compensation. They also identified that the ideal system would contain
relational contracts that involve the contractor in an integrated organization (CII RT271, 2012). These characteristics of the “ideal delivery system” closely resemble
those of the collaborative delivery methods used in other construction sectors, which
indicates that members of the industrial sector are interested in adopting these
collaborative delivery methods.
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Following the findings from RT-271, CII charged RT-341 with exploring the business
case of using collaborative delivery methods on industrial projects. Of the 85
industrial projects CII’s RT-341 studied, they found that those implementing more
collaborative and integrated practices had significantly more predictable project
outcomes (CII RT-341, 2019). RT-341 concluded that industrial projects using more
collaborative practices are benefitting from outcome certainty, and this should be a
large driver for adopting collaborative delivery methods.
The findings from both RT-271 and RT-341 demonstrate that there is a strong
demand for a more collaborative approach to project delivery in the industrial sector.
With RT-341 laying out the business case for adopting collaborative delivery
methods, this study was charged with helping clients in the industrial sector make the
transition to this new era of capital project delivery. The central research objective of
this thesis was:
To help facilitate the industrial sector’s adoption of collaborative project delivery
methods.
This research was limited to investigating the application of collaborative project
delivery methods to industrial projects. The definition of an industrial project was
adopted from Barutha (2018) who offers the following definition: “Industrial projects
are capital investments designed by engineers to furnish specific process capacities to
achieve business objectives, centered on the development of production capability”
(Barutha, 2018).
A literature review was conducted to examine where knowledge was lacking on the
implementation of collaborative project delivery methods. Three gaps in knowledge
were identified that, if addressed, would facilitate the industrial sectors adoption of
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collaborative delivery methods. This thesis consists of three related papers that each
address one of the needs identified below.
1.4.1 1 – What Project is a Good Candidate for Collaborative Delivery?
Once a client decides to explore alternative project delivery systems, often their first
question is: what project is a good candidate for collaborative project delivery? The
first paper in this thesis investigates this question. Existing research on collaborative
delivery methods suggests that the decision to use a collaborative delivery method
may be the single most important decision in a projects lifecycle (DTF Victoria,
2006). Despite the importance of this decision, current guidance on what type of
project is suitable for collaborative delivery remains vague, and at times,
contradictory.
1.4.2 2 – Lessons Learned About the Shared Risk/Reward Model
The second paper in this thesis explores lessons learned about the commercial terms
used on collaborative delivery methods. Collaborative delivery methods employ a
shared risk/reward commercial model to promote collaboration between all of the key
project stakeholders. These commercial terms are a foreign concept to clients in the
industrial sector and a case study conducted by Cohen (2010) revealed that previous
clients who have adopted the IPD delivery method took many months of contractual
negotiations before they were content with the commercial terms. The objective of the
second paper is to help clients understand and implement the terms in the shared
risk/reward commercial model.
1.4.3 3 – Framework for Evaluating Success
The long-term adoption of collaborative delivery methods in the industrial sector is
contingent on them providing superior outcomes to traditional delivery methods.
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Once a client decides to adopt a collaborative project delivery method, it is necessary
for them to determine how they will evaluate its performance. It may seem
paradoxical that clients could deliver projects without knowing what it means, or how
to evaluate their success, but a review of project management literature reveals that
the topic of measuring project success has been widely contested (Chan, 2001). The
final paper in this thesis addresses this gap by developing a project success framework
that will enable clients compare the performance of an industrial projects delivered
under different project delivery methods.
1.5

Research Methodology

Each paper in this thesis adopted a unique data collection methodology to best suit the
needs of its research objective. The specific methodologies are detailed in each
chapter, with data sources including semi-structured interviews, a web-based
questionnaire, a research charrette, and a targeted survey.
Chapter 2 used an exploratory mixed methods approach to understand what types of
projects are good candidates for collaborative project delivery. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted with seven subject matter experts from New Zealand and
Australia. This was followed by a web-based questionnaire that was distributed to
professionals in the industrial sector. 49 complete responses were received, and this
quantitative component was used to test the hypotheses developed from the
qualitative interviews.
Chapter 3 used a qualitative approach to explore the lessons learned about the shared
risk/reward commercial model. Data collection for this paper was coordinated with
the paper in Chapter 2, therefore, the seven semi-structured interviews that were used
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to answer the questions of Chapter 2 were also used to answer the questions for
Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 used an exploratory mixed methods approach to develop a framework to
evaluate the performance of collaborative delivery methods on industrial projects. A
research charrette was initially conducted to develop the framework and then a
targeted survey was distributed to professionals in the industrial sector to validate the
framework. 12 members from the industrial sector participated in a three-hour long
research charrette to develop the framework. 41 total responses were received from
the targeted survey to help validate the metrics within the framework.
The data collection sources for the three papers are summarized in Figure 1-4.

Figure 1-4. Data collection summary of each paper.
Prior to the collection of any data, a standard application was submitted to the
Institution Review Board (IRB) of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. The IRB
categorized the research as exempt and was approved with IRB #: 20191219809EX.
A full copy of the approval letter is shown in Appendix A.

14
1.6

Significance of this Study

Many forces are driving industrial projects to change. As our societies continue to
grow at unprecedented rates, so does our demand for infrastructure, electricity, and
other commodities. A study by McKinsey & Company forecasts that global
infrastructure investment will reach $13 trillion by 2030, a 109% increase from the $6
trillion spent in 2013 (Changali et al., 2015). To satisfy the increase in these demands,
they also predict that “billion-dollar-plus megaprojects will account for a greater share
of these projects”. Edward Merrow’s (2012) also predicts an increase in the average
size of projects because doing so allows organizations to benefit from economies of
scale.
As the characteristics of industrial projects change, it is important that our methods
and management practices adapt to meet the challenges these new projects present.
The studies by EY, Merrows, and McKinsey and Company, suggest that the current
delivery process is unable to manage the challenges of modern industrial capital
projects. The consequences of poor project delivery include losses to company
shareholders, insecurity of employment, delay in the provision of key services, and a
cost to the world economy.
To deal with the challenges of modern industrial projects, clients in this sector must
consider adopting new processes. To help clients overcome barriers that are
associated with adopting unfamiliar work processes, the academic community must
provide guidance on how and when to use these new delivery methods.
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1.7

Organization / Readers Guide

This thesis is organized in a three-paper format. This thesis begins with an
introductory chapter, followed by the three related papers, and ends with a concluding
chapter. A summary of each chapter is given below.
Chapter 1 informs the reader of the issues associated with the traditional design-bidbuild delivery method and establishes the need for this study. The chapter also details
the three specific research problems, their methodologies, and the significance of this
study.
Chapter 2 presents the first paper. Paper one addresses what type of industrial project
is a good candidate for collaborative delivery. Clients will find this paper useful prior
to their decision to use a collaborative delivery method.
Chapter 3 presents the second paper. This paper provides a detailed overview of the
shared risk/reward commercial model and then explores the lessons from those who
have implemented this complex commercial arrangement. Clients will find this paper
useful once they have decided to go ahead with a collaborative delivery method and
are in the stage of developing their contract.
Chapter 4 presents the third paper. This paper develops a framework to compare the
performance of an industrial project delivered under a collaborative delivery method
to one delivered under a traditional delivery method. Clients will find this paper
important once they have already decided to implement a collaborative delivery
method.
Chapter 5 presents the overall conclusions and limitations of this research. It also
provides avenues for future research.
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2.

CHAPTER 2 – WHAT PROJECT IS A GOOD CANDIDATE FOR
COLLABORATIVE PROJECT DELIVERY?

2.1

Introduction

It is widely recognized that selecting the appropriate project delivery method for a
project is critical to promote good outcomes (DBIA, 2015; Department of Public
Works, Queensland, 2008; NSW Department of Commerce, 2005). Some authors
have claimed that careful project selection is the single most important decision when
using collaborative delivery methods (DTF Victoria, 2006; Young et al., 2016). It is
therefore in the interest of clients to understand what types of projects collaborative
delivery methods will promote outcomes superior to those achieved through
traditional delivery methods. Despite the importance of this decision, the current
guidance on what projects suit collaborative delivery methods remains vague and
unhelpful. Wood and Duffield (2009) summarize the current literature this way:
“There is a plethora of selection guidelines on the use of the alliance delivery method
that are inconsistent, confusing, do not reflect current practice, and are not focused on
optimizing VfM [value for money]”. To help clients in the industrial sector maximize
the probability of successful implementation of this delivery method, this research
investigates what project characteristics suit collaborative project delivery. This
research used a combination of semi-structured interviews and a web-based
questionnaire to explore four key project characteristics.
2.2

Literature Review

2.2.1 Alliancing Guidelines
To better understand what types of projects are suitable for collaborative delivery
methods, a range of government guidelines, white papers, books, and research articles
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on alliancing were reviewed. Table 2-1 presents a summary of the discourse reviewed
and presents the project characteristics that each document identified as being
important for the consideration of alliancing. The list of characteristics is ordered
from the most frequently cited to the least frequently cited.

X

X

(Ross, 1999)

X

X

(Frame et al., 2019)

X

X

(Hayford, 2018)

High Risk

X

Project Characteristic

(Department of Public
Works, Queensland, 2008)

X

(NSW Department of
Commerce, 2005)

X

(Henneveld, 2006)

(Ross, 2003)

X

(Young et al., 2016)

(DTF Victoria, 2006)

Tight Timeframe

(NZTA, 2019)

(ADIRD, 2015)

Table 2-1. Literature Review Summary of Project Characteristics that Suit
Collaborative Project Delivery Methods.

X

X

X

Count

X

X

X

Unclear / Broad Scope

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Difficult Stakeholder Challenges

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

High Complexity

X

X

High Uncertainty

X

Complex External Threats

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Brownfield Project

X

X

X

8
X

X

7

X

X
X

Seeking Extraordinary
Outcomes

X

High Profile Project

X

8

4
X

X

8

X

4

X
X

Need for Innovation
High Project Value

X

9

X

4
3
3

X

2
1

The literature review revealed that the current guidance on what types of projects are
suitable for alliancing is not well defined. Risk and complexity are of the most
frequently cited characteristics, but each of these terms are complicated topics in their
own right and lack clear definition. This makes it challenging for organizations that
have not yet implemented this delivery method, because they are left wondering how
much risk or how complex is enough to suit this new approach? There also appears to
be a relationship between these characteristics but this relationship has not been
clearly defined. Another issue with the current guidance is that various characteristics
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appear to evaluate the project at different elevations. For example, complex
stakeholder issues can be considered a specific risk event. So, how does this relate to
the all-inclusive term “risk”? Questions like this have not yet been answered.
2.2.2 IPD Guidelines
Four leading IPD guidelines were reviewed for guidance on when to apply IPD (AIA,
2007; Fischer et al., 2017; Kenig et al., 2010; Thomsen et al., 2016). Despite various
authors identifying how important it is to apply collaborative delivery methods to the
correct project, these readings offered no guidance on the types of projects IPD is
appropriate for.
2.3

Overall Methodology

This study used a sequential exploratory research design to explore the types of
projects that are suitable for collaborative project delivery methods. There were two
primary data collection phases: Phase A, consisting of semi-structured interviews; and
Phase B, consisting of a web-based questionnaire that was distributed to members of
construction research institutions. A sequential exploratory design was utilized so that
the concepts of risk, complexity, and project size could first be explored and
understood prior to the development of the questionnaire. This study aimed to answer
the following research question:
What industrial projects are suitable for collaborative project delivery methods?
2.4

Phase A: Qualitative Methodology

Seven interviews were conducted with a mix of clients, consultants, and contractors to
better conceptually understand what characteristics indicate a project is well suited for
collaborative delivery methods. Participants were selected based on their seniority in
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their respective organizations, as well as their experience with alliance projects. The
interviews were semi-structured and asked for the participant’s thoughts on four
characteristics and how they relate to a project’s suitability for collaborative delivery.
The four characteristics that were explored were: risk, complexity, time frame, and
project dollar value. The interview protocol can be found in Appendix B. Interviewees
were located in Australia and New Zealand, and the interviews were conducted via
Zoom. Each interview lasted between 45-60 minutes. Four of the participants were
found through the researcher’s professional network; the other three came from
referrals provided by the initial four interviewees. Descriptive information on the
interview participants is provided in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2. Descriptive Information about the Interview Participants.
Participant

Years’
experience

Organization

Position

A

25

Alliancing
Consultant

Managing Partner

B

45

Consultant

Principal

C

40

Client

D

32

Client

E

35

Client

F

26

Contractor

G

24

Client

2.5

Regional Portfolio
Manager
Director of
Prequalification’s
and Contracting
Director of
Infrastructure
Procurement
Operations
Manager
Regional Portfolio
Manager

# of Alliance
projects involved
with

Location

Executed = 8
Involved = 100+
Executed = 1
Involved = 3
Executed = 2
Involved = 1

New Zealand

Executed = 1
Involved = 5

Australia

Executed 2
Involved = 20+

Australia

Executed = 1

New Zealand

Executed = 2

New Zealand

Australia

New Zealand

Phase A: Qualitative Results and Discussion

2.5.1 Risk
When participants were asked how a project’s risk relates to its suitability for
collaborative delivery, there was consensus among all seven interviewee’s that risk
was the single most important variable. In fact, Participant C noted, “risk is the
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characteristic that should determine the selection of any PDM”. This resounding
agreement that risk is the critical factor for selecting a project for collaborative
delivery is consistent with the existing literature on alliancing.
Although interviewee’s reported risk as the primary driver for using a collaborative
delivery method, risk is a term that is often used in a nebulous, catch all, manner. To
provide definition to the concept of risk, interviewees were asked to explain their
understanding of risk. To help organize the discussion, participants were presented
two categories of risk as it is defined by the UK Association for Project Management.
The UK Association for Project Management separates risk into “risk events” and
“project risk” (Association for Project Management, 2012). Risk events are defined
as: “an uncertain event or set of circumstances that, should it occur, will have an
effect on achievement of one or more of the project's objectives”. Project risk is
defined as: “the exposure of stakeholders to the consequences of variations in
outcome”. Figure 2-1 was developed to help conceptualize the difference between
these categories of risk.

Figure 2-1. A visual representation of risk events and project risk.
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The interviewees were presented the two categories of risk and asked if their
conceptualization of risk related to risk events or project risk. All the participants
indicated that they were referring to risk events. However, the participants reported
that “risk” more specifically referred to the aggregate likelihood that a project would
fail to meet its defined objectives, rather than a single risk event. This aggregate
probability that outcomes would vary from their targets does not appear to have a
formal name in risk management literature and among practitioners has assumed the
name “risk”.
Participant A suggested that this term “risk” would
be more appropriately termed “uncertainty” because
changes in outcomes can be both negative and

“The key to selecting the correct
contracting strategy is to ask
yourself how much don’t we
know… and that is risk, or more
precisely, uncertainty”

positive. Participant A said, “The key to selecting
- Participant A

the correct contracting strategy is to ask yourself
how much don’t we [the client] know… in my opinion [a projects suitability for
collaborative delivery] is a single dimension, and that is risk, or more precisely,
uncertainty”. Participant G reinforced this concept of uncertainty by explaining that
alliancing is suitable for projects “where we haven’t quite got everything sorted and
we [the client] still need to get the project going”.
Each interview participant was asked if there are risk events that create a high
uncertainty project. Participant G identified stakeholder management as a critical risk
that drove the decision to use an alliance on a $600 million dollar transportation
development in New Zealand. The project stretched across 156 different landowners,
and accommodating their needs into the execution of the project was of significant
concern to the funding agency. Participant G noted that stakeholder management was
the primary driver for another alliance project that consisted of installing a new
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reticulated wastewater network to 950 private properties. Participant C discussed a
$300 million transportation development in New Zealand that was delivered under the
alliance model. This project required significant amounts of surcharge loading to
consolidate the subgrade to acceptable levels of compaction. The time required to
reach consolidation was the primary risk that drove the decision to use the alliance.
Participant A has experience with hospital projects.
Participant A said these projects are “ridiculously
uncertain because it’s so hard to know what the
stakeholders want. They will change their minds up
to the last minute, and government will also make
changes because there is a natural public interest to

“The complexity in hospitals is
that all of the players want to
have a say in the final design.
The nurses all need to have a
say, surgeons need a say,
administrations need a say, the
funders need a say, owners of
the hospital management need a
say because they are responsible
for outcomes, and the
maintenance team need a say.”

do so”. Participant A claimed that the source of
- Participant B

uncertainty on hospital projects primarily comes
from the difficulty of defining their specifications and design. Participant B, who also
has experience with hospital projects, reinforced Participant A’s claims. Participant B
said, “The complexity in hospitals is that all of the players want to have a say in the
final design. The nurses all need to have a say, surgeons need a say, administrations
need a say, the funders need a say, owners of the hospital management need a say
because they are responsible for outcomes, and the maintenance team need a say”.
Participant B gave an example of a recent $500 million hospital project where there
were 23 stakeholder groups that had representatives provide input into the hospital’s
conceptual design.
The interviews revealed that projects with high uncertainty in their outcomes are good
candidates for collaborative delivery. Interesting themes emerged regarding potential
sources of this uncertainty. The interviewees had experience in two major
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construction industries: civil infrastructure, and hospital projects. For the civil
infrastructure projects, the sources of uncertainty appeared to be associated with risk
events that could occur after the project’s construction had begun. Uncertainty was
introduced because risk events could manifest during execution that would impact the
projects objectives. A common risk event that was identified was the management of
stakeholders that would be impacted by the project, such as private landowners or the
general public. It also appeared that the objective of this stakeholder management was
to minimize the disruption to the stakeholders affected. In contrast, the primary
sources of uncertainty for the hospital projects appeared to stem from the challenge of
incorporating multiple conflicting stakeholder interests into the projects specifications
and design. This can also be thought of as stakeholder management, but with the
objective of maximizing the value of the project to each of the stakeholders. Figure 22 provides a graphical representation of the different sources of uncertainty that

Design Uncertainty

emerged from the interviews.

Execution Uncertainty

Figure 2-2. Two dimensions of uncertainty that increase a projects suitability for
collaborative delivery
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2.5.2 Complexity
In contrast to the current recommendations found in literature, each of the
interviewees noted that complexity was not a good indicator of a project’s suitability
for collaborative delivery. Participant C said, “I don’t think it is complexity, I think it
is risk”. Similarly, Participant A said, “it’s not complexity, it is uncertainty”. It is
unclear why literature refers to complexity so frequently regarding the application of
collaborative delivery methods. A possible explanation for this is that uncertainty may
be more challenging for practitioners to conceptualize than complexity, thus, people
default to the term complexity.
The interviewees made it clear that complexity and

separated. Participant C said: “You can have a very

“You can have a very
technically complex project
with low risk, and you can have
simple projects with high risk”

technically complex project with low risk, and you

- Participant C

risk/uncertainty are concepts that can and should be

can have simple projects with high risk”. Participant C used the previously mentioned
transportation alliance as an example. They stated that there was nothing complex
about the surcharge loading, but there was very high uncertainty regarding the
duration that would be required to reach an acceptable consolidation. Participants D
and E also shared that they had delivered simple projects under alliances, and
complex projects under traditional agreements.
Although a clear separation between complexity and uncertainty was made, several
participants identified that there is a relationship between the two. Participant C
mentioned that there are situations where complexity can create uncertainty. They
said, “If you have a technically complex problem plus a lack of time, then that
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presents a risk and may make a case for sharing that risk”. Participant A also
mentioned that there is a relationship between complexity and uncertainty.
This finding supports the previous claim that the primary driver for using a
collaborative delivery method is its risk/uncertainty. This also suggests that, in certain
instances, a project’s complexity may create high levels of uncertainty, which would
make it suitable for this form of delivery; however, simply because the project is
technically complex, does not automatically qualify it for collaborative delivery.
2.5.3 Tight Timeframe
The most frequently cited characteristic in literature that makes a project suitable for
collaborative delivery is one with a tight timeframe. During the interviews,
participants were asked if collaborative delivery methods reduce project delivery
time, and if that was a critical factor into their use of the delivery method. In contrast
to expectations, the interviewees were not convinced that using collaborative delivery
methods reduces overall project duration. Participant C disagreed that collaborative
delivery methods reduce delivery time because, in their experience, the procurement
time is significantly longer when employing this delivery method. This increase in
procurement time was said to counter any savings that result from overlapping the
design and construction phases. It is possible that this extended procurement duration
is a result of comprehensive procurement policies in Participant C’s organization;
however, Participants D and E reported similar doubt over a reduction in project
duration from separate client organizations.
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Participant A proposed that the reason why this
criterion appears so frequently in literature is
because there is a relationship between a
project’s time constraints and its uncertainty.

“Time and uncertainty are related in
that, if you are in a rush, you haven’t
had a chance to assess the situation
and think it all through”
- Participant A

Participant A said, “Time and uncertainty are
related in that, if you are in a rush, you haven’t had a chance to assess the situation
and think it all through”. Participant A explained that the time constraint is less about
reducing overall project duration and more about how quickly the project needs to get
out to the market. The faster it needs to get to market, the more uncertainty you are
likely to have. This could explain why the alliance delivery method has been adopted
in New Zealand as an effective way to delivery disaster recovery work. It is very
difficult to predict the extent of work required immediately following a natural
disaster; therefore, there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with these projects.
To summarize, the interviewees indicated that collaborative delivery methods are
suitable for projects where there is urgency to begin the work, and that urgency
creates high uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the project.
2.5.4 Project Dollar Value
The Australian Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development currently
recommend alliancing only for projects that have project dollar value greater than $50
million (AUD) (ADIRD, 2015). The interviewees were asked about their opinions on
this minimum project value. Two conflicting opinions were presented.
Four of the participants (A, B, D, and F) disagreed with the minimum project value.
Participant D said that they had employed a collaborative contract on projects as low
as $20 million (AUD), and thinks that the commercial model can be applied to
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projects of any size. Participant A noted that, similarly to the time dimension, there is
a relationship between a projects value and its uncertainty. Participant A asserted that
project value is a tangible measure, unlike uncertainty, so it may simply be an
objective proxy measure for uncertainty.
Three reasons emerged why collaborative delivery methods should be limited to
projects with high dollar value. The first reason relates to the cost of forming of a
temporary organization. Participant C explained that there are costs with branding,
temporary office space, coaches, team building events, vehicle branding, new
business systems, etc., so the project needs to be of sufficient value to support these
expenses. The second reason raised was that the ongoing project specific overhead
costs are higher using this delivery method. In Participant G’s experience, these
additional project overheads were a result of the additional staff required to run an
alliance on a day-to-day basis. Additional staff included full accounting,
administrative, and design teams, which are not usually present under traditional
delivery models. The third reason identified is that the cost of procuring an alliance is
expensive. Participant C explained that the cost to procure an alliance from a
supplier’s perspective is significantly greater than under traditional models. For this
reason, Participant C reasoned that clients should reserve collaborative delivery
methods for projects with budgets to support the high procurement costs.
The interviewees were divided on the need for a minimum project value for the use of
collaborative delivery methods. An interesting observation was noted between those
who were for and those who were against a minimum project value. Those who were
in favor of a minimum project value consistently identified the cost of establishing
and running a temporary organization as the reason why this delivery method should
be reserved for projects with high project value. In contrast, the group who were
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against the need for a minimum project value argued that the commercial terms could
be implemented on a project of any size.
This observation raises the question: what defines a collaborative delivery method?
As mentioned in the introduction, collaborative delivery methods distinguish
themselves from traditional delivery methods based on their agreements and
commercial terms, but this observation suggests that there could be more to it than
that. Yeung et al. (2007) proposed that the alliancing delivery method is defined by
both “hard” factors and “soft” factors. The hard factors include a formal multi-party
agreement and a shared risk/reward commercial model. The soft factors include
common goals and objectives, a win-win philosophy, early selection of contractors,
and agreed problem resolution methods, among others. The interviewees indicated
that Yeung’s “hard” factors can be applied to a project of any size, but the use of the
“soft” factors may be dependent on the size of the project. The interviewees
specifically noted that the formation of a temporary organization would need to be
reserved for projects with sufficient dollar value to support its procurement,
formation, and operational costs.
2.6

Phase B: Quantitative Methodology

In a sequential exploratory study the quantitative phase is a follow up to the
qualitative phase (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). In this study, the quantitative phase
served to further explore four research questions. This section provides a review of
the research questions, their associated hypotheses, and the development and
distribution of the web-based questionnaire that was used to test each hypothesis.
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2.6.1 Hypotheses
The four research questions that were investigated through the web-based
questionnaire are:
Research Question 1: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s risk
and its suitability for collaborative project delivery?
Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s
complexity and its suitability for collaborative project
delivery?
Research Question 3: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s
schedule challenge and its suitability for collaborative
project delivery?
Research Question 4: Is there a relationship between an industrial project’s dollar
value and its suitability for collaborative project delivery
methods?
Based on the findings from the semi-structured interviewees, four hypotheses were
developed about each of the four research questions. All the interviewees agreed that
risk was the primary driver for using a collaborative project delivery method,
therefore, the first hypothesis was:
H1: Industrial projects with higher risk are more suitable for collaborative project
delivery methods.
In contrast to current guidelines the interviewees provided no indication that a
project’s complexity is a good indicator of its suitability for collaborative delivery.
The second hypothesis was:
H2: There would be no relationship between an industrial project’s complexity and its
suitability for collaborative project delivery methods.
The interview participants revealed that a project’s pressure to begin the work would
be a good indicator of its suitability for collaborative project delivery. The third
hypothesis was:
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H3: Industrial projects with more challenging schedules are more suitable for
collaborative project delivery methods.
The interviewees gave indication that projects with higher dollar value were better
suited to collaborative project delivery methods, therefore, the fourth hypothesis was:
H4: Industrial projects with higher dollar value are more suitable for collaborative
project delivery methods.
Each hypothesis is based on the suitability of an industrial project for collaborative
delivery. The Collaboration and Integration Index (C.I. Index) developed by CII’s
RT-341 was adopted as a proxy measure of a project’s suitability for collaborative
project delivery. The C.I. Index is a measure of the intensity and frequency of the
collaboration and integration principles and methods used on a project (CII RT-341,
2019). The principles are defined as principles that “align the interest and objectives
of project stakeholders and to better share the gain/pain”, and the methods are defined
as those that “help to enhance communication and teamwork among the project team
members” (CII RT-341, 2019).
2.6.2 Survey Development and Distribution
Data to test each hypothesis was collected through a web-based questionnaire
developed in Qualtrics. Members from CII’s research team RT-383 helped with the
development and piloting of the questionnaire. This advisory group of practitioners
consisted of 9 core members (4 client/owners, 1 contractor, 3 consultants, and 1
supplier), who are hereinafter referred to as the “research team”.
Prior to the development of the questionnaire, the research team met to review and
update the collaboration and integration principles and methods used to develop the
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C.I. Index. The final nine principles asked on the survey are shown in Table 2-3, and
the final 21 methods are shown in Table 2-4. Definitions for the list of principles and
methods can be found in Appendices C and D.
Table 2-3. The 9 Collaboration and Integration Principles Measured on the
Questionnaire.
Collaboration and Integration Principles
1.
3.

Continuous communication and issue
resolution
Jointly developed and validated targets

2.
4.

5.

Access to shared information systems

6.

7.

Early involvement of stakeholders

8.

9.

Collaborative and equitable decision
making

Financial transparency among key
participants
Shared risk and reward
Relational contracting (multi-party
agreement)
Negotiated risk distribution

Table 2-4. The 21 Collaboration and Integration Methods Measured on the
Questionnaire.
Collaboration and Integration Methods
1.
3.
5.
7.
9.
11.
13.
15.
17.
19.
21.

Alternative scheduling method
Co-location
Constructability planning in the design
phase
Formal partnering / team building
Front end planning (FEP)
Joint risk assessment tool
Multi-party agreement
Multi-party project management team
Mutual liability waivers
No dispute charter
Preassembly and modular construction

2.
4.
6.

Quality improvement process
Rapid process improvement workshops
Contract incentives

8.
10.
12.
14.
16.
18.
20.

Standardized design techniques
Design to cost (target value design)
Use of technology as an integration tool
Value engineering
Value stream mapping
Advanced work packaging
A3 decision making

The equation for calculating the C.I. Index is shown in Equation 1.

𝐶. 𝐼. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
100

Where,

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =

𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =

# 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 − 1
𝑥 100 𝑥
𝑥 100
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠
4
# 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 − 1
𝑥 100 𝑥
𝑥 100
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑀𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑠
4

(1 )
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The questionnaire adopted a similar overall design to that used by CII’s research team
RT341, in that respondents were asked to identify a project that demonstrated high
levels of collaboration and integration (CII RT-341, 2019). The questionnaire first
asked for demographic information from the respondent, and the remainder of the
questionnaire collected information about the identified project. The collected data
was reviewed in Excel for inconsistencies and then input into SPSS for analysis.
Two pilot tests were completed to ensure that the questions were written in a way that
would transfer the desired intent to the respondent, and to test for the required time to
complete the survey. The initial pilot revealed that the survey required too much time
to complete and various questions were rearranged into matrix tables. The
reformatting of questions reduced the survey time, meaning that no questions needed
to be removed. The research team members also requested additional definition to be
provided with each question. This feedback was received through Zoom review
sessions.
The questionnaire was distributed to CII member companies, to PTAG’s partner
companies, to CURT’s member companies, and through the professional networks of
the research team members. The questionnaire was originally distributed on
November 16, 2020, with a planned duration of two weeks, but due to low response
rates was left open until January 28, 2021. The analyses performed in this paper
includes data collected up to January 28, 2021, but the research team decided to keep
the survey open to continue collecting responses past this date. The operationalization
of each of the variables used to test the hypotheses is discussed in the following
section.
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2.6.3 Operational Definitions
Risk / Uncertainty
The interviewee’s revealed that uncertainty and risk are terms that are often conflated,
and that, while uncertainty is the real construct, the term “risk” tends to resonate
better with practitioners. Accordingly, the questionnaire was developed to collect data
on the level of risk on the identified project. Risk was defined as: the likelihood that
the project will fail to meet its objectives. Respondents were asked to rate the level of
risk from very low to very high (1 - 5) for each of the risk categories shown in Table
2-5. A Risk Index was calculated as the average of the 10 risk categories. Examples of
specific risk events that could occur within each category was included as an
attachment for the respondents, see Appendix E.
Table 2-5. The 10 Risk Categories Measured on the Questionnaire.
Risk Categories
1.
3.
5.
7.
9.

Funding
Geotechnical and Subsurface
Design
Weather
Construction

2.
4.
6.
8.
10.

Environmental
Scope Change
Political and Community
Land Acquisition
Organizational

Complexity
CII’s research team RT-305 investigated and developed a tool to measure the
complexity of an industrial project. However, their team approached complexity from
a management perspective, rather than a characteristic of the project. They state, “the
research team chose not to describe complexity primarily in terms of a project’s
physical features… but rather to describe complexity related to managing projects”
(CII RT-305, 2016). The selection of a delivery method should be based on a project’s
characteristics; therefore, the research team deemed that RT-305’s complexity
indicators were not suitable for this study. Instead, Wood and Ashton’s operational
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and technological complexity scale was adopted for this study (Wood & Ashton,
2010). The final items included in the complexity scale are shown in Table 2-6, and
each item was asked in comparison to a typical project, ranging from much less to
much more complex (1 – 5). A Complexity Index was generated by averaging the 10
items.
Table 2-6. The 10 Complexity Items Measured on the Questionnaire.
Complexity Items
1.

Value of the project

2.

Overall complexity of the project's
design / engineering systems
Complexity of the project's
construction methods

3.

Number of the stakeholders

4.

5.

Need for end user input into the design
/ engineering options

6.

The systems and equipment used on
this project were cutting edge

7.

Technical knowledge required to
complete the design / engineering

8.

The systems and equipment on the
project were highly interrelated

9.

Amount of mechanical and electrical
work

10. The review of the project's systems and
equipment was complicated and
involved many stakeholders

Schedule Challenge
The third hypothesis investigated the relationship between how challenging a
project’s schedule is, with how suitable it is for collaborative delivery. Respondents
were asked how challenging the projects schedule targets were compared to a typical
project, and this was measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from much less
challenging to much more challenging (1 – 7).
Project Value
Each respondent was asked to provide the dollar value of their identified project. This
value was used to test the fourth hypothesis.
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2.7

Phase B: Quantitative Results and Discussion

2.7.1 Descriptive Statistics
A total of 49 completed questionnaires were received. Figure 2-3 presents the
distribution of responses received from clients, contractors, engineers/designers, and
other organizations, and the split of responses that were received from public and
private representatives.
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Figure 2-3. Survey response breakdown by organization and type of funding.
The number of projects identified from each industry sector, as defined by CII, and
the project’s type of funding is shown in Figure 2-4. CII’s project sector breakdown is
provided in Appendix F. Figure 2-5 shows the distribution of the value and duration
of the identified projects.
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Figure 2-4. Survey response project breakdown by sector and type of funding.
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Figure 2-5. Distribution of the value and duration of the identified projects.
2.7.2 Risk / Uncertainty
For each of the 49 identified projects, a Risk Index was calculated based on the 10
items defined in Section 2.6.3 (Mean = 2.845, Std = 0.612). Cronbach’s alpha was
used to evaluate the internal consistency of this index, which was .821, exceeding the
standard of .70 suggested by Nunnally (1978) for exploratory research. Figure 2-6
shows a graph of the Risk Index (x-axis) plotted against the C.I. Index (y-axis).
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Figure 2-6. Relationship between the Risk Index and C.I. Index.
Visually, there appears to be a relationship between the level of risk of an industrial
project, and the amount of C.I. methods and principles being used. Pearson’s
correlation test was conducted to test this relationship. Table 2-7 shows that there was
a significant linear relationship between a projects risk and its C.I. Index, r(47) = .318,
p = .026, providing support for the first hypothesis.
Table 2-7. Pearson Correlation of Risk and C.I. Index.
Variable

Mean

Std

N

Correlation

P-value

Risk Index
C.I Index

2.845
19.880

.612
19.574

49
49

0.318

0.026

Figure 2-7 shows that industrial projects with medium-high risk (>3) appear to have
higher variation in the number of C.I. methods they are willing to employ. The
variability in the number of C.I methods and principles used can be represented by the
standard deviation. The standard deviation in the C.I. Index for projects that had risk
index greater than 3.0 was 23.4, and the standard deviation for those projects with risk
index less than 3.0 is 11.2. Figure 2-7 captures this difference in variation. The
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difference in this statistic shows that projects with high risk are using a much wider
range of C.I. methods and principles than those with low risk.
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Figure 2-7. Comparing the standard deviation of projects with low risk to those with
high risk.
While a significant relationship was found, the degree of association between the
variables is low to moderate. Figure 2-8 shows that there is a group of projects with
high risk but low C.I. Index. A plausible explanation for why these projects did not
employ more collaborative practices is that their organizations were not experienced
with the implementation those practices. Additionally, using CI methods and
principles can be viewed as its own risk to an organization that is not experienced
with their implementation. Organizations may therefore choose to avoid adopting new
practices on projects that are already high in risk as a means to protect themselves
from the inherent risk of the project. Doing things, “the way they have always been
done”, acts as a risk mitigation strategy because the organization is familiar with the
process, even if that process is not optimal.
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Figure 2-8. Identifying projects with high risk and low C.I. Index
2.7.3 Complexity
For each of the 49 identified projects, a Complexity Index was calculated based on the
10 items defined in Section 2.6.3 (Mean = 3.582, Std = 0.566). Cronbach’s alpha was
used to evaluate the internal consistency of this index, which was .815, exceeding the
standard of .70 set forth by Nunnally (1978). The Complexity Index and the C.I.
Index were plotted in Figure 2-9, and visually indicate that there is no relationship
between an industrial project’s complexity and its C.I. Index.
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Figure 2-9. Relationship between the Complexity Index and the C.I. Index.
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To test the second hypothesis a Pearson’s correlation was conducted between the
Complexity Index and the C.I. Index. Table 2-8 presents the results of this correlation
test. This statistical test reveals that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that
there is a significant relationship between a projects complexity and its C.I. Index,
r(47) = .162, p = .265, which supports the second hypothesis.
Table 2-8. Pearson Correlation between Complexity Index and C.I. Index.
Variable

Mean

Std

N

Correlation

P-value

Complexity Index
C.I Index

3.582
19.880

0.566
19.574

49
49

0.162

.265

2.7.4 Schedule Challenge
The third hypothesis investigated if there is a relationship between how challenging
an industrial project’s schedule is and the number of C.I. methods and principles used.
Figure 2-10 plots the level of challenge of the projects schedule compared with a
typical project (x-axis) against the C.I. Index (y-axis).
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Figure 2-10. Relationship between the projects schedule challenge and the C.I. Index.
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Due to the ordinal nature of the schedule compression variable, a Spearman’s
correlation was conducted to test the rank order relationship between the two
variables. Table 2-9 presents the results of this analysis. The Spearman’s correlation
reveals that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a significant
relationship between how challenging the projects schedule was and its C.I Index,
rs(47) = -0.010, p = .945.
Table 2-9. Spearman Correlation between Schedule Challenge and C.I. Index.
Variable

Mean

Std

N

Correlation

P-value

Schedule Challenge
C.I Index

5.306
19.880

1.158
19.574

49
49

-0.010

0.945

2.7.5 Project Dollar Value
The fourth hypothesis investigated if there is a relationship between a project’s dollar
value and the number of C.I methods and principles used. The value of the projects
identified by respondents were highly positively skewed (3.056), therefore the project
value variable was log transformed to meet the normality assumptions that are
necessary when testing for bivariate association (Kowalski, 1972). Figure 2-11 shows
a plot of the log transformed project value (x-axis) with the C.I. Index (y-axis).
100
90
80

C.I. Index

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

11.0

Log10(Project Dollar Value)

Figure 2-11. Relationship between the dollar value of the project and the C.I. Index.
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Pearson’s correlation test was conducted to test the fourth hypothesis. Table 2-10
shows that there was a significant linear relationship between the log of the project
value and its C.I. Index, r(45) = .325, p = .026. This relationship can be interpreted as
follows: as the value of an industrial project increases in order of magnitude, there is a
linear increase in the number of C.I. methods and principles used.
Table 2-10. Pearson Correlation between Project Value and C.I. Index.
Variable

Mean

Std

N

Correlation

P-value

Log(Project Value)
C.I Index

8.087
19.880

1.132
19.574

47
49

0.325

0.026

2.8

Overall Discussion

The purpose of this study was to understand what type of industrial projects would be
good candidates for collaborative delivery methods. This study used semi-structured
interviews with Project Alliance expects from Australia and New Zealand followed
by a survey of members from the industrial sector to explore how four project
characteristics influence a projects suitability for collaborative delivery.
The main contribution of this study is that it identifies that a project’s risk, or more
precisely, the uncertainty of its outcomes, is the primary driver for using a
collaborative project delivery method. This finding was found unanimously
throughout the series of interviews and then supported quantitatively through a webbased questionnaire. This finding brings clarity to the existing literature on the types
of projects that collaborative delivery methods are suitable for. This knowledge will
help support future research on the application of collaborative delivery methods,
which will help clients from all construction sectors develop their procurement
policies.
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Because this delivery method is suitable for projects that contain high levels of
risk/uncertainty, clients may be hesitant to implement a new practice to these types of
projects. Implementing an unfamiliar delivery method to projects with high levels of
risk/uncertainty may be viewed as taking a “leap of faith”. The web-based
questionnaire revealed that there are still many industrial projects that contain high
levels of risk/uncertainty but do not employ many collaborative practices. This may
stem from the belief that implementing new practices introduces its own risk;
therefore, many organizations default to what they are used to, and what they are
comfortable with. The reality is that continuing with existing practices contains the
risk of producing the same substandard project outcomes that the industry is currently
producing. Collaborative delivery methods provide clients with an opportunity to
change this, but one of the barriers that has yet to be discussed it that these delivery
methods are suitable for projects that clients are simply not willing to experiment on.
Complexity is frequently discussed in alliancing guidelines as a good indicator for
collaborative delivery. In contrast to the recommendations from literature, the
interviewees suggested that complexity was not a good indicator for collaborative
delivery. The quantitative findings provided support for the claims made by the
interview participants in that no relationship was found between an industrial
project’s complexity and the amount of collaboration and integration methods and
principles that were used.
The most frequently cited characteristic for using a collaborative delivery method is a
project with tight time constraints, but little definition has been provided on this
characteristic. The interview participants suggested that collaborative delivery
methods are good candidates for projects that need to begin work as soon as possible.
The interviewee’s related this characteristic to uncertainty, as projects that need to go
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to market sooner will have less time for planning and thus more uncertainty. The
quantitative phase of this study was unable to find a relationship between how
challenging an industrial project’s schedule was, and how many collaborative
practices they employed.
Although the quantitative results of this study were not able to support the findings
from the qualitative phase, this variable should not be discarded from future research.
The frequency in which this variable appears in literature suggests that it is an
important characteristic and should not be neglected. It is possible the subjective
operationalization of this variable introduced error into the quantitative analysis,
potentially confounding the results.
A minimum project value for collaborative delivery appears to be common policy
among government agencies in New Zealand and Australia. The Australian
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development guidelines recommend that
alliancing be reserved for projects larger than $ 50 million (AUD) (ADIRD, 2015).
The interview participants were divided on whether a minimum project value was
necessary to deliver a project under a collaborative delivery method. Part of the
disagreement appeared to stem from the participants having different opinions on
what constitutes a collaborative delivery method. Further research is required on
whether collaborative delivery methods require a minimum project value.
To date, there have been no studies that have compared the distribution of costs
between a collaboratively delivered project and a project delivered under traditional
models. Such a study could identify how and where the costs differ between the two
delivery methods and this could help to answer questions relating to a minimum
project value necessary to support collaborative delivery.

45
2.9

Conclusions

Prior to this effort, little work has been conducted on understanding what type of
project is suitable for collaborative project delivery. The major contribution of this
study is uncovering that a projects risk, or more precisely, a project with high
uncertainty of its outcomes, is the fundamental driver for using a collaborative
delivery method. Additionally, in contrast with current guidance, this study found no
evidence to support that a project’s technical complexity is a good indicator of its
suitability for collaborative project delivery. These findings will help clients in the
industrial sector with identifying projects that will have the greatest probability of
benefitting from this new type of project delivery.
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3.

CHAPTER 3 – LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT THE SHARED RISK /
REWARD COMMERCIAL MODEL

3.1

Introduction

One important feature that separates a collaborative delivery method from other
traditional delivery methods are its commercial terms (ADIRD, 2015; DTF Victoria,
2006). These commercial terms, often referred to as the “shared risk/reward”
agreement, are a fundamentally new way for clients to engage with their engineering
and construction service providers. The shared risk/reward model separates profit and
overheads from direct project costs, and shifts the basis of profit from an individual’s
performance to the overall project’s performance, providing stakeholders with a
monetary incentive to collaborate (AIA, 2009)
The shared risk/reward agreement is considerably more complex than traditional
agreements, and since its appearance in the late 90’s, little research has been
completed to understand the effectiveness and practical implications of each
component in this agreement. The Construction Management Association of America
(CMAA) developed an owner’s guide to project delivery methods. In this guide they
state that one of the disadvantages of IPD is “agreement on the criteria and the final
IPD contract can be very difficult and can take an inordinate amount of time and
effort, for which the owner may be paying, if not in money then in time” (CMAA,
2012).
The objective of this paper is to help reduce the time needed for clients in the
industrial sector to familiarize themselves with these new commercial terms. This is
achieved by first providing a detailed review of the commercial model, and then semistructured interviews with practitioners are used to provide lessons learned on the use
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of the shared risk/reward commercial model. The lessons captured will help clients in
the industrial sector understand these complex commercial terms and will help them
develop their own shared risk/reward models for collaboratively delivered projects.
3.2

Overview of the Shared Risk/Reward Model

This paper first provides a detailed overview of the shared risk/reward commercial
model to familiarize the reader with the structure of the commercial terms. The shared
risk/reward model is employed on both IPD and alliancing project delivery methods
and presents an elegant way to prevent the issues of misalignment and fragmentation
caused by traditional commercial models. Two extracts from IPD and alliancing
guidelines presented in Table 3-1 demonstrate that, conceptually, the two commercial
models strive to achieve the same objective; that is, to remunerate non-owner
participants (NOPs) for their direct costs, and to tie their profit to the client’s
evaluation of project success.
Table 3-1. Comparing Extracts from Alliancing and IPD Commercial Models.
IPD Commercial Model

Alliancing Commercial Model

(Fischer et al., 2017)

(ADIRD, 2015)

“All or part of the participants’ profit is
placed at risk and profit may be augmented
if project performance is met or exceeded.
Individual profit is not a function of the
amount of work performed, or of individual
productivity, but is proportionate to overall
project success.”

“Under the Risk or Reward Regime, the
NOPs agree to put all (or a certain
percentage) of their Corporate Overhead
and Profit at risk, tied to their performance
against the TOC [target outturn cost] and
other non-price project objectives.”

The objective of the shared risk/reward model is to create a situation where all parties
share in the benefit of a successful project, and equally, share in the pain from a
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poorly delivered project. The intent of the shared risk/reward model is shown in
Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Objective of the shared risk/reward commercial model (Ross, 1999).
This win:win, lose:lose proposition is achieved by tying the profit of the NOPs to the
performance of the project (Fischer et al., 2017). In turn, this creates a “best for
project” mind set, rather than the “best for myself” mind set found in traditional
models (Kenig et al., 2010). Tying the profit of NOPs to the performance of the
project, rather than their individual scopes of work, actually provides NOPs with a
monetary incentive to collaborate (AIA, 2009), whereas in traditional models,
collaboration is expected simply out of goodwill. Additionally, expanding the
definition of performance from just cost metrics gives clients an opportunity to
incentivize their non-financial project outcomes, avoiding the misalignment of
interests described in the introduction.
Although the alliancing and IPD extracts show that both the commercial models strive
to align the compensation of the service providers with the performance of the project,
there is a notable difference in the amount of literature that exists on how each
delivery method achieves that goal. Literature on IPD and how profit should be tied to
performance is light; in fact, most sources do not provide practical guidance on how
to implement this principle. Conversely, alliancing guidelines have created a clear and
consistent structure on how to do this. This is possibly because IPD has been adopted

49
by private clients in the healthcare industry, whereas alliancing has primarily been
used by public agencies and as such, has had formal procurement guidelines
developed.
Considering that both IPD and alliancing seek to achieve the same objective, and also
considering that the existing literature on the alliance commercial model is more
comprehensive, this paper adopts the terminology and structure of the alliance
commercial model.
The shared risk/reward commercial model utilized on alliance contracts is often
characterised as a “3-limb model” (ADIRD, 2015; DTF Victoria, 2006; Gransberg et
al., 2015; Ross, 2001). Under the 3-limb model, each NOP that is a signatory to the
agreement will be compensated as follows:
Limb 1: Reimbursed for the actual direct cost of the work (including rework
and wasted effort) and project-specific overheads.
Limb 2: A fee to cover profit and non-project-specific (corporate) overheads.
Limb 3: An increase or reduction in compensation dependent on the overall
performance of the project.
A graphic representation of the 3-limb commercial model is displayed in Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2. The 3-limb commercial model (DTF Victoria, 2006).
3.2.1 Limb 1 and Limb 2
What separates the shared risk / reward model from other commercial models is the
Limb 3 component. The Limb 3 component enables clients to adjust their NOPs profit
based on the performance of the project. For this reason, this study focuses on
capturing lessons learned specifically relating to the Limb 3 incentive mechanism. For
principles and recommendations on the development of the Limb 1 and Limb 2
components, readers should refer to (DTF Victoria, 2006) and (ADIRD, 2015).
3.2.2 Limb 3
The Limb 3 mechanism is the key mechanism that incentivizes exceptional
performance in cost and non-cost areas (ADIRD, 2015). The Limb 3 component
incentivizes NOPs to achieve exceptional performance in Key Result Areas (KRAs)
by adjusting their profit through two mechanisms: the cost performance mechanism,
and the non-cost performance mechanism.
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Cost Performance Mechanism
The cost performance mechanism incentivizes NOPs to achieve the client’s cost
targets by sharing in any cost underruns and cost overruns (ADIRD, 2015; DTF
Victoria, 2006; Ross, 2003). This is often referred to as “pain/gain sharing”, and the
client and the NOPs typically share pain/gain at a 50:50 split. The potential downside,
“pain”, for the NOPs is usually capped at their total limb 2 fee, after which the client
will absorb any further cost overruns. A graphic representation of how the cost
performance mechanism functions is presented in Figure 3-3.
Limb 2 fee
exhausted
50:50 pain/gain
sharing

Client absorbs all
further overruns

Pain / Gain

Client’s share
of gain

NOPs share
of gain

Underruns
Total Under/Overrun

NOPs downside
risk capped

Target
Cost

Overruns
NOPs Share of Under/Overrun

Figure 3-3. Typical cost performance mechanism.
Non-Cost Performance Mechanism
The non-cost performance mechanism enables clients to incentivize their NOPs to
achieve their non-financial objectives. The non-financial objectives are incentivized
by the Overall Performance Score (OPS). The OPS is a weighted score of the NOPs
performance in various non-cost KRAs. The non-cost KRA scores are also calculated
as a weighted score of their respective Key Performance Indicator (KPI) scores. The
KPI scores, KRA scores, and OPS each range between -100 to 100. A graphic
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representation of the relationship between the three scores is shown in Figure 3-4. The
KPI scores are calculated based on an agreed relationship between a specific KPI and
its KPI score. Figure 3-4 shows that this relationship does not need to be linear and
will need to be negotiated between the client and their NOPs. The agreed relationship
between a KPI and its KPI score should be designed so that a score of 100 should
indicate exceptional performance, and a score of -100 should represent substandard
performance.

Figure 3-4. Relationship between the KPIs, KRAs, and OPS.
Figure 3-5 provides an example of a schedule KPI. The schedule KPI may relate the
days over/under the target schedule to a KPI score. An agreement between the client
and NOPs will need to occur to set how many days over/under schedule will
constitute exceptional and substandard performance. Figure 3-5 shows an example of
a linear scale relating days early/late to its KPI score.
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Figure 3-5. Example relationship between schedule KPI and KPI score.
Based on the OPS score, clients can use one or both of the following mechanisms to
incentivize the achievement of their non-cost KRAs.
1. KRA Pool: The OPS score can be linked to a pool of funds (KRA Pool)
that the owner will pay to the NOPs in the case of exceptional performance
(OPS > 0), or the NOPs will refund the owners for substandard performance
(OPS < 0). If the OPS exceeds zero, the owner will make an extra payment to
the NOPs based on a linear scale up to an agreed maximum value. If the OPS
is less than zero, the NOPs will refund the owner based on a linear scale up to
an agreed maximum. A graphic representation of the KRA Pool mechanism is
presented in Figure 3-6. Note, the KRA Pool maximum and minimum values

KRA Pool Value

do not need to be equal.

Max KRA
Pool

-100

-50

0

50

Min KRA
Pool

OPS

Figure 3-6. KRA Pool mechanism.
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2. Pain/Gain Modifier: The OPS score can also be linked to adjust the cost
over/underrun sharing ratio. In the instance of good performance in the noncost KRAs (OPS > 0), NOPs can increase their share of underruns or decrease
their allocation of overruns. Alternatively, in the case of poor non-cost
performance (OPS < 0), NOPs will reduce their share of underruns and
increase their allocation of overruns. The Department of Treasury and Finance
of Victoria suggests the OPS score should adjust the cost over/underrun
sharing agreement by +/- 20% (DTF Victoria, 2006). A graphic example of a
+/-20% pain/gain modifier is presented in Figure 3-7.
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NOP Pain/Gain Share
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50

100

OPS Score
Underrun

Overrun

Figure 3-7. +/- 20% Pain/Gain modifier example.
Limb 3 Summary
The previous section has shown that there are various mechanisms that clients can use
to tie compensation to project performance. Figure 3-8 was developed to help
visualize how each of these mechanisms work together to determine the final Limb 3
value.
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Figure 3-8. Visualization of the different incentive mechanisms in the Limb 3
component.
3.3

Methodology

Creswell and Poth (2018) explain that, “we conduct qualitative research because a
problem or issue needs to be explored… we also conduct qualitative research because
we need a complex, detailed understanding of the issue. This detail can only be
established by talking directly with people”. The objective of this paper is to explore
the lessons from practitioners on the components of the shared risk/reward
commercial terms. This objective is exploratory by nature and a qualitative
methodology was deemed most appropriate to capture the nuances associated with
this topic. Another motivating factor for using a qualitative approach is that it allows
for clarification of questions to ensure the participants fully understand the questions
being asked. This is particularly important when discussing these detailed commercial
terms. The qualitative approach enabled the researcher to provide real time
clarification of the questions which would not have been available through more
traditional quantitative approaches.
Data for this paper was collected through seven semi-structured interviews. Data
collection for this paper was coordinated with the qualitative data collection of
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Chapter 2. For information about the interview participants and the population
sampling procedure, see Section 2.4. Following the questions asked in relation to
Chapter 2, the interviewees were asked specific questions about the shared
risk/reward commercial model. The Limb 3 component of the shared risk/reward
model was separated into two mechanisms: the cost performance mechanism, and the
non-cost performance mechanism. For each mechanism, participants were asked if
they thought it was beneficial to project outcomes and if there is anything that they
would change in future agreements. Participants were also questioned on how they
decided what parties would be included in the agreement. For the interview protocol,
see Appendix B.
3.4

Results and Discussion

The objective of the interviews was to capture lessons about each component in the
shared risk/reward commercial model. The findings are organized and presented by
those related to the cost performance mechanism, the non-cost performance
mechanism, and deciding who to include in the agreement.
3.4.1 Cost Performance Mechanism
Pain/Gain Sharing
All seven interviewees indicated that the pain/gain mechanism was the most
important part of the commercial terms and the driver of different behavior.
Participant G noted, “I think it’s very critical. If you do not have that, you are not
going to drive any change in behaviors because, at the end of the day, it is still a
commercial arrangement. It is still a contract, and the objective of the NOPs is to
make money”. This finding is consistent with the results of Love et al, who also
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reported that the “share in the profit/loss was a driving factor for collaborative
behavior and achieving cost efficiencies” (Love et al., 2011).
The participants also appeared to believe that the pain/gain sharing mechanism was
more influential than the non-cost mechanism. Most interviewees supported the use of
the non-cost KPIs, but they were described as a nice to have and not essential.
Participant C said, “They [non-cost KPIs] are important, and we want them, but they
are more in the nice to have category”. Participant C also said, “I think the price
mechanism [pain/gain mechanism] is definitely the big thing, because that allows you
to build the project”.
NOP Risk Cap
The interviewees were asked for their opinion on the NOP risk cap. Participant D
reported that while there can be good reason to implement this mechanism, it has its
drawbacks. Participant D explained, “With caps, there is no incentive once the
threshold is reached”. If a project enters painshare (limb 2 is totally exhausted), then a
contractor can become unmotivated to perform. Participant D reported that in an
alliance that was performing poorly, there was high turnover of key personnel from
the contractor’s organization, making the project come to a halt. This concern was
shared by Participants C and G, who also mentioned that they had experienced an
alliance where most, or all, of the limb 2 fee was lost, and that created situations
where the contractor lost motivation. And once that happened the client really begun
to suffer.
The interviewees revealed that capping the downside risk of NOPs can compound a
client’s risk if the project becomes distressed. Not only must they absorb all cost
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overruns after the Limb 2 fee is exhausted, but they will need to absorb the losses
associated with the contractor losing interest in the project.
When asked what they would do differently, Participant D proposed, “rather than
having caps, perhaps risk and profit should be shared 50/50 to a point and then apply
a diminished risk and profit share”. For example, clients and NOPs could share
pain/gain at a 50:50 split up to the Limb 2 fee, and any further pain/gain could be split
85:15 between the client and NOPs, respectively. Figure 3-9 depicts the proposed
model. Participant C, another client representative, was presented this alternative
model. Participant C indicated that, while this had never been discussed, it made good
logical sense to have the same sharing relationship between the gain and pain sides.
Participant C did raise a concern about this proposed model, saying, “as soon as you
put the direct cost of the NOPs at risk, they will build contingency into their limb 1
fee”. This is a fair critique of the alternative pain/gain sharing model and shows that
decisions relating to the risk cap mechanism require a trade-off.
Limb 2 fee
doubled
85:15 pain/gain
sharing

Limb 2 fee
exhausted

50:50 pain/gain
sharing

50:50 pain/gain
sharing

85:15 pain/gain
sharing

Pain / Gain

Client’s share
of gain

NOPs share
of gain

Underruns
Total Pain/Gain

Target
Cost

Overruns

NOPs Share of Pain/Gain

Figure 3-9. Proposed pain/gain share arrangement.
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One of the criticisms of the shared risk / reward commercial model is that it
incentivizes parties to inflate their target cost (Henneveld, 2006; Thomsen et al.,
2016; P. Wood & Duffield, 2009). Another attractive quality of the proposed model
for sharing cost over/underruns is that the higher percentage of retained savings for
the owner would protect them from cases where the target cost was excessively
inflated.
3.4.2 Non-Cost Performance Mechanism
KPIs
Interviewees were asked if there was anything they would change about the non-cost
KPIs that were included in their contracts. Participants B and G explained that their
non-cost KPIs actually did change during the course of their projects’ execution.
Participants B and G revealed that their contracts contained provisions that enabled
the KPIs to be reviewed. Participant G reported that they were involved in an alliance
were the KPIs were reviewed every six months, and the alliance management team
had the opportunity to change the KPIs. Participant G revealed that the management
team did change KPIs some of the KPIs because the original KPIs were not providing
proper representation of the performance of the project. In other words, the OPS
indicated the project was more successful that what the management team believed,
and the provision enabled them to fix that.
KRA Pool
All seven participants stated that there was a minimum KRA Pool value that was
needed to incentivize the NOPs to pursue them. However, no participant could
identify a policy or rule of thumb for what this minimum should be. Participant C
said, “It has to be a meaningful amount of money, otherwise they [the NOPs] will not
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put any effort into achieving it”. In the study by Love et al. (2011), they observed that
alliance KRA Pools ranged from 0.55 – 3.6% of the total project value.
Participant C noted, in their experience, the KRA pool usually is limited by political
reasons. Participant C reported that, in an alliance that is about to be tendered, local
Politian’s view the KRA Pool as a completion bonus, and do not support the KRA
Pool. Participant C suggested that a client could ask themselves, “How much can you
include in the KRA pool and reasonably justify, then take a critical look at whether
that amount would incentivize you to chase it”. It was also recommended that clients
use the tendering period to directly ask the NOPs if the value of the KRA Pool is
sufficient to encourage them to pursue those outcomes.
3.4.3 Who to Include in the Agreement
Case studies on IPD projects have revealed that a wide range of parties have been
included in the shared risk/reward commercial agreements (Cheng & Johnson, 2016).
Some involve only the client, the prime contractor, and a prime architect/engineer;
others include each of those as well as several key suppliers. The interviewees were
asked what parties they viewed as being critical to include in the agreement.
Participant D said, “You must consider which participants have an interest in the risks
and the ability to influence outcomes”. This sentiment was echoed by all participants,
suggesting that it would change for every project.
Three of the Participants (C, F, and G) reinforced the importance of this issue by
presenting cases where the exclusion of key contractors or suppliers from the
agreement led to poor project outcomes. Participant F gave an example of a steel
supplier who was not included in the commercial terms and indicated this was a
mistake because the steel work ended up delaying the overall project. Had their profit
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been at risk of the overall project, Participant F contended that they would have given
the project more attention.
Participant G also gave an example of an alliance where the earthworks subcontractor
was not included in the main alliance agreement. Instead, the prime contractor entered
into a sub-alliance agreement with the earthwork subcontractor. A sub-alliance
agreement contains many of the same provisions as a main alliance but is between a
main alliance participant and one of their sub-contractors, and only for a specific
scope of work. Participant G believed that the decision to use a sub-alliance was the
leading reason why the project failed to meet both time and cost targets. They
explained that the sub-alliance caused the culture to effectively revert to the
fragmented and self-interested environment found on traditional contracts. This was
because the sub-alliance contractor’s compensation was no longer tied to the overall
project’s performance; instead, their compensation was in relation to the completion
of their specific scope of work. This reportedly reduced their willingness to
collaborate with other parties, and this unwillingness greatly impacted other critical
parts of the project, extending the project’s completion date by over 25%. Figure 3-10
shows a graphical representation the problem experienced on this project.
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Figure 3-10. Depiction of sub-alliance contractor unwilling to collaborate with other
subcontractors.
When asked how a client should determine who to include in a collaborative
agreement, none of the interviewees could identify a formal process. Participant G
noted that there is an important difference depending on how the project is tendered.
Under a non-price model, the client selects which contractor and engineer to engage
with. In this case, the client has full control over which parties to include in the
agreement and needs to use their best judgement. In contrast, under a competitive
model, the client releases an RFQ/RFP, and a consortium of contractors and engineers
respond to that RFQ/RFP. Under the competitive model, the client leaves the decision
of who to include in the shared risk/reward agreement up to the organization leading
the consortium.
This distinction is important because Participant G suggested that clients who
competitively tender their collaborative agreements are leaving the critical decision of
who to include in the agreement up to another party. As described above, failing to
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include key contractors and suppliers has led to poor outcomes, so it should be in a
client’s interest, regardless of tendering method, to have a say in who is part of the
agreement.
3.5

Conclusions

The shared risk/reward commercial terms are complex, and it is challenging for
clients to understand the implications of each of its components. To address this issue,
this paper explored lessons from clients that currently implement these unique
commercial terms. The key lessons learned include the following:
1. The pain/gain sharing mechanism is the primary driver of more collaborative
behavior. The non-cost KRAs are “nice to have” but are less influential than
the pain/gain mechanism.
2. If a project enters painshare and the risk cap threshold is reached, the
contractor may lose motivation to perform. Clients may want to consider
alternative risk capping arrangements to ensure contractors will remain
engaged regardless of the state of the project.
3. Contract provisions that enable management to review KPIs are an effective
approach to ensure that the KPIs reward the project team for above average
performance.
4. A minimum KRA Pool is necessary to incentivize the project team to pursue
those non-cost outcomes.
5. Excluding key contractors or suppliers from the commercial agreement can
result in poor project outcomes.
6.

Using sub-alliances may lead to traditional fragmented and adversarial
behavior between the sub-alliance contractor and other project participants.
Further investigation is required on the performance of sub-alliances.
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4.

CHAPTER 4 – FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF
COLLABORATIVELY DELIVERED INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS

4.1

Introduction

As clients in the industrial sector begin adopting collaborative delivery methods there
will be a need to evaluate if this delivery method provides superior outcomes to
projects executed under traditional delivery methods. Currently, there are no
frameworks that compare the performance of industrial projects that are executed
under different delivery methods. The objective of this research is to develop a Project
Success Framework (PSF) that will enable clients in the industrial sector to
benchmark the performance of their traditional projects and make more informed
decisions about the effectiveness of collaborative delivery methods in this sector.
Additionally, as shown in Chapter 3, the shared risk/reward commercial agreement
uses non-cost KPIs to measure and incentivize performance. To achieve optimal
performance of collaboratively delivered projects, it is important for project teams to
clearly define, measure, and assess important performance outcomes. The PSF
developed through this study is aimed to inform industrial project practitioners of
metrics that can be used to incentivize high performance.
4.2

Background on Project Success

This problem is a subset of the topic of project success and how it should be
measured. Bannerman (2008), Müller and Jugdev (2012), and Soon Han et al. (2011),
have all identified that there are two distinct streams of research on project success:
project success criteria, and project success factors. Project success criteria is research
on how the success of a project is evaluated. Specifically, this refers to the
information required to evaluate if a project was, or was not, successful. The second
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stream of research relates to factors that affect the success of a project. This stream of
research focuses on understanding why two different projects may have been
delivered with different levels of success. The objective of this paper is to develop a
framework to evaluate the success of an industrial project, so this literature review
focuses on the first stream of research. The literature review begins with a review of
the conceptual models of projects success and is followed by a review of the
pragmatic approaches that have been taken to evaluate the success of construction
projects.
4.2.1 Conceptual Models of Project Success
It would be difficult to find an article on the project success that does not mention
cost, time and quality criteria. Most authors, including, but not limited to, Al-Tmeemy
et al. (2011), Atkinson (1999), Baccarini (1999), Chan (2001), Lim and Mohamed
(1999), Müller and Jugdev (2012), Pinto and Slevin (1988), each refer to these three
criteria as fundamental to the evaluation of a project’s success. These three criteria
have become so deeply engrained in the understanding of project success that
Atkinson coined them the “iron triangle”. However, Atkinson suggests that the “iron
triangle” is not wrong, but incomplete, and he suggests that reducing success to these
three measures is akin to a Type 2 error. Atkinson presented his own interpretation of
project success which consisted of two dimensions: the delivery stage, and the postdelivery stage. The deliver stage dimension relates to the traditional outcomes of
meeting cost, time, and quality targets. The post-delivery stage dimension relates to
providing benefit to the project stakeholders, ensuring users are satisfied with the
product, and ensuring the outcome meets the needs of the customer.
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Pinto and Slevin’s seminal work on project success has helped people understand the
importance of being able to evaluate a project’s success (Pinto & Slevin, 1988). They
explain that a project manager’s bonuses, promotions, and overall career are often
dictated by how “successful” they are in delivering of projects. Pinto and Slevin
developed a conceptual model of project that success that had two primary
dimensions: the project and the client. The project dimension relates to the project
meeting cost, time, and quality targets. The client dimension relates to whether the
project works and addresses a problem, to the satisfaction of the products users, and to
whether the project will lead to more effective decision making.
Shenhar (1997) proposed that project success must be perceived in relation to four
hierarchical dimensions. Dimension 1, Project Efficiency, relates to the traditional
three criteria of success, cost, time, and quality. Dimension 2, Impact on the
Customer, relates to the need for projects to serve their original purpose. Dimension 3,
Business and Direct Success, relates to whether the project achieved its strategic
goals. Dimension 4, Preparing for the Future, relates to how the project helped its
organization prepare for future opportunities.
Lim and Mohamed (1999) proposed a conceptual model of project success for
construction projects. They separated project success into a micro and macro
viewpoint. The micro viewpoint is concerned with the results of the construction
project at the end of the construction phase such as cost, time, quality, and safety. The
macro viewpoint relates to whether or not the project fulfilled the needs of the user or
stakeholders.
Baccarini (1999) separates project success into project management success and
product success. Under Baccarini’s model, project management success relates to the
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project meeting its budget, schedule, quality. In a similar fashion to Lim and
Mohammad’s macro viewpoint, and Shenhar’s business success dimension,
Baccarini’s product success relates to the extent to which the project satisficed the
stakeholders needs and achieved its original purpose.
Each of the conceptual models of project success were summarized based on the
outcomes that they deemed were necessary to achieve on a successful project. Table
4-1 presents this summary.

Pinto and Slevin

Shenhar

Lim and Mohamed

Baccarini

Outcome
Met cost objectives
Met schedule objectives
Met functional and technical requirements
Provided benefit to project stakeholders
Users are satisfied with the product
Project outcome meets needs of the customer
Project increased organizational capability
Project led to more effective decision making
Project was delivered safely

Atkinson

Table 4-1. Summary of the Conceptual Models of Project Success.

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

Bannerman (2008) explains that one of the challenges in determining if a project is
successful is that one must first decide if a project is a means to an end, or if it is an
end in itself. If a project is assumed to be a means to an end, then its performance
should reflect how well the project achieved its strategic goals and how well it met its
end user’s needs. Alternatively, if the project is considered an end, then its success
can be determined at its closeout stage based on traditional characteristics such as
time, cost, and quality. Bannerman suggests that a project fits into one category or the
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other. However, the previously detailed frameworks from Baccarini, Lim and
Mohamed, Shenhar, and Atkinson, each suggest that a successful project is one that is
successful as an end itself, as well as a means to other strategic and client ends.
4.2.2 Pragmatic Approaches
The aforementioned conceptual models provide insights to the range of outcomes that
a project must achieve to be an overall success. However, each of them fails to
provide measurement of the key project outcomes. Cost and time are usually defined
as whether or not the project met its budgeted cost or planned duration, but the other
criteria, such as the benefit to project stakeholders, are often provided with no specific
measurable item. Other researchers have taken more pragmatic approaches to the
measurement of a construction projects success. These are discussed below.
The KPI Working Group (2007) provides a two-step framework for measuring the
success of a civil construction project. The two-step framework consists of Key
Result Areas (KRAs), which are key outcomes that a project must achieve, as well as
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which are specific measurable outcomes that are
used to evaluate the performance in each KRA. The KPI Working Group provides six
KRAs that define the success of civil infrastructure projects. The six KRAs and their
definitions are shown in Table 4-2.
The KPI Working Group provides a range of KPIs that are used to measure each of
the KRAs. The KPIs and their method of measurement can be found in Appendix G.
Franz (2014) also used a two-step framework to defined the success of building
projects. He defined success using cost, schedule, and quality KRAs, and provided
specific KPIs to measure each of them. Franz’s KPIs are shown in Appendix G.
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Table 4-2. The KPI Working Group’s KRAs and their Definitions.
KRAs

Definition

Client Satisfaction

Defects

Measures how satisfied the client was with the quality of the finished product
and the service (of the whole project team).
Usually measured at or shortly after completion and handover
Measures the degree to which the completed facility was free from defects
that impacted on the client. Usually measured at the point the project is
offered for handover.

Cost

Measures how well out-turn costs compared with original estimates.

Time

Measures how closely the project was delivered to the original timetable

Safety

A measure of the number of Lost Time Incidents per 200,000 hours worked.
Equivalent to 100 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) employees.

Profitability

Measures company profit before tax and interest as a percentage of sales.

El Asmar et al. (2016) developed the “project quarterback rating” (PQR) to represent
the success of building projects. The PQR is an aggregated performance index from a
linear weighted sum of KPIs and KRAs. The PQR consists of seven KRAs and
multiple KPIs within each KRA. The model of the PQR is shown in Appendix G.
The Construction Industry Institute (CII) is a center for research and development for
best practices in the capital projects industry. Several of CII’s research teams have
developed performance frameworks to validate their tools and findings. CII’s PreProject Planning Research Team (RT-039) developed a success index that was a
linear weighted sum of two KRAs and four KPIs (CII RT-039, 1994). RT-039’s
success index is shown in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3. RT-039’s Project Success Index.
KRA

KPI
Budget Achievement

Project Success
Schedule Achievement

Measurement
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Design Capacity Attained

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

Plant Utilization

# 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑛 6 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠
182

Operating Success
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4.3

Overall Methodology

This research used a sequential exploratory mixed method design to build and validate
the PSF for industrial projects. This methodology was chosen for several reasons.
First, the concept of project success is a complex phenomenon, and the exploration of
complex phenomena is well suited to qualitative methods (Creswell & Plano Clark,
2018). Second, survey dominant research methods have several drawbacks in
construction research, such as low response rates, long response times, and long
development periods (Gibson & Whittington, 2010).
The PSF for industrial projects was developed through two phases. Phase A consisted
of a research charrette that was used to develop the structure of the PSF. In Phase B, a
focused survey was developed and used to validate the PSF framework. The details of
each phase are provided below.
Throughout the course of this study, CII’s research team RT-383 helped to guide the
direction of this research. This advisory group of practitioners consisted of 9 core
members (4 client/owners, 1 contractor, 3 consultants, and 1 supplier), who are
hereinafter referred to as the “research team”. The knowledge of the research team
was leveraged for the development of the framework, and the research team members
were critical in the distribution and completion of the targeted survey.
4.3.1 Phase A: Research Charrette
An increasingly common research method in construction research in the structured
workshop or “research charrette” (Gibson & Whittington, 2010). According to Gibson
and Whittington (2010), research charrettes are an effective exploratory technique as
they combine the best tenets of surveys, interviews, and focus groups in an
accelerated time frame. Research charrettes have also been successfully used in a
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variety of other exploratory construction studies, including Esmaeili et al.’s (2013)
study of project success for building projects, and in the development of the PDRI for
building projects (Cho & Gibson, 2000). For these reasons, a research charrette was
deemed an effective approach to exploring the complex and multidimensional topic of
evaluating the success of an industrial project.
As Gibson and Whittington explain, the construction industry typically does not
permit probabilistic sampling because it is logistically impossible to define a sample
frame. Therefore, the purposive sample of participants for the research charrette
consisted of the research team members, as well as other industrial sector senior
managers that were invited by the chair of RT-383’s research team. There were 12
total participants, with 5 client representatives, 4 consultants, and 3 academics.
On June 18, 2019, a three-hour long research charrette was held to develop the KRAs
and KPIs which would form the PSF. The research charrette was held in Lincoln,
Nebraska. Participants were first refreshed on the objective of the workshop and the
relationship between the KRAs, KPIs, and project success. CII’s RT-341 completed a
literature review to identify common Key Result Areas (KRAs) that have been used to
define the success of construction projects (CII RT-341, 2019). This work was used as
the starting point for the group discussion and participants were given a printed list of
the 14 KRAs identified by RT-341. Each KRA was discussed as it relates to the
evaluation of the success of an industrial project. A group consensus was required to
include any of the KRAs in the final framework. To help participants conceptualize
the KRAs, they were given the following instruction:
“If you were an owner and had to demonstrate that project A was more successful
than project B, what are the areas that you would discuss?”
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After the KRA task was completed, the group discussed KPIs that are representative
of each of the KRAs. To help facilitate the discussion, each participant was given a
list of KPIs that have previously been used to measure success on research projects.
The participants of the research charrette were instructed that the KPIs must be
measurable and accessible across all types of industrial projects. Similarly to the
KRAs, a consensus among the group was required to include any KPI in the final
framework. Notes were taken during the charrette, and then the framework was
created in a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet. Once the spreadsheet was finalized it was
distributed to the research team for review.
4.3.2 Phase B: Validation Survey
To validate the relationship between the KPIs and KRAs, and to ensure these metrics
are measurable across different projects, a targeted survey was developed. This survey
asked respondents to categorize each KPI into one of the KRAs. If the KPI is
categorized with the same KRA that was developed during the research charrette,
there would be good indication that the KPI is representative of that key area of
project success. A web-based questionnaire was developed in Qualtrics, and each
member of the research team was instructed to send it to 10 people in their
professional network. Definitions of each KPI and KRA were provided to respondents
as downloadable pdfs to assist with their response. To mitigate the effects of order
bias, the list of KPIs were randomly displayed to each participant.
4.4

Results

The objective of this paper was to develop a framework that would allow clients in
the industrial sector to compare the performance of a collaboratively delivered
project, with a project that was delivered under traditional delivery methods. The
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results from the research charrette are provided first, and then the results of the
targeted survey are presented.
4.4.1 Qualitative Research Charrette Results
The first objective of the research charrette was to finalize a comprehensive list of
KRAs that can be used to compare the success of an industrial project executed under
different delivery methods. Figure 4-1 shows the 11 KRAs that participants from the
research charrette decided would be important to compare.

Figure 4-1. The 11 KRAs that shape the success of industrial projects.
Definitions for each of the final 11 KRAs developed during the research charrette are
presented in Table 4-4.
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Table 4-4. Definition of the 11 KRAs for Industrial Projects.
KRA

Definition

Cost Competitiveness

This construct represents a measure of how competitively the project was
priced compared to the typical market conditions at the time the project
was delivered. The objective of this KRA can be thought of as capturing
the “value for money” that the owner receives.

Cost Certainty

Cost certainty represents a measure of how well the project’s actual costs
met the project’s early cost targets.

Schedule
Competitiveness

Schedule competitiveness is a measure of how competitively the project’s
schedule was compared to typical market conditions at the time the
project was delivered.

Schedule Certainty

Schedule certainty represents a measure of how well the project’s actual
schedule met the project’s early schedule targets.

Quality

Quality represents a measure of how well the project’s products and
services complied with its plans and specifications. This is not to be
confused with the quality of the finishes used on the project.

Safety

Safety represents a measure of the frequency of recordable safety
incidents that occurred on the project.

Project Functional
Objectives

A projects functional objectives is a measure of how well the project
achieved the client’s functional objectives as defined in the client’s
business case that was used to justify the project’s funding.

Project Financial
Objectives

Financial objectives is a measure of how well the project achieved the
financial objectives of all of the major participants in the project
(typically the client, contractor, and engineer).

External Stakeholder
Impacts

External stakeholder impacts is a measure of how much the execution of
the project impacted external stakeholders. External stakeholders can
include the public, the client’s end users, or the client’s internal
operations.

Environmental
Impacts

Environmental impacts is a measure of the frequency and magnitude of
recordable environmental events that occurred on the project.

Change Management

The change management construct represents a measure of the frequency,
size, and duration of changes that occurred on the project.

Client satisfaction was one of the 14 KRAs that was discussed by the team during the
research charrette, but in contrast to popular trends in project success literature, was
not included in the final framework. One of the participants during the research
charrette said:
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“if we delivered a project and it met all of the other KRAs, our organization would
continue to do business with that service provider, regardless of our personal
relationship”
There was consensus among the participants on this perspective. The group argued
that, if a project met all of the other KRAs, then their clients would be satisfied and
this would be redundant, so this KRA was removed from the final framework.
After the KRAs were finalized, the group identified KPIs that would be representative
of the high order KRAs. The original list of KPIs developed during the research
charrette is shown in Appendix H.
4.4.2 Validation of the KPIs
To validate that the KPIs are representative of their higher order KRA, a targeted
survey was distributed to professionals in the industrial sector asking them to
categorize each KPI into its respective KRA. After data cleaning, a total of 41
responses were received. The respondents’ average number of years of experience
was 21.5 years, with a standard deviation of 11.3 years. The sample population
represented 21 clients, 10 contractors, and 10 engineers/consultants. 32 respondents
primarily worked in the heavy industrial sector, 5 in the light industrial sector, 4 in
power, utilities and infrastructure, and one in the building sector.
Each respondent was asked to categorize the list of KPIs into one of the 11 KRAs.
Table 4-5 presents each KPI, the KRA it was categorized into during the research
charrette (expected), and the KRA that was categorized most frequently in the
targeted survey. Table 4-5 also indicates if there was a match between the expected
and found KRA categorization.
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Table 4-5. KPI Categorization from the Targeted Survey.
KPIs
Contingency Index
Cost Efficiency
Direct Work Rate
Productivity
Contingency Used %
Cost Variation
Buffer Index
Time per Unit
Schedule Variation
Construction Defects
Design Defects
Non-conformance reports
Quality Performance
Rating
Commissioning Time
DART Rate
TRIR
Goal Achievement
Contractor Financial
Objective Realization
Owner Financial
Objective Realization
Complaints
External Stakeholder
Impact
Notice of Violation
Recordable
Environmental Events
Change Cost Index
Change Time Index
Non-owner Initiated
Changes
Owner Initiated Changes
Speed of Change
Approval

KRAs
Top Survey
Expected
Categorization
Cost Competitiveness
Cost Certainty
Cost Competitiveness
Cost Competitiveness
Cost Competitiveness
Cost Competitiveness
Cost Competitiveness
Cost Certainty
Cost Certainty
Cost Certainty
Cost Certainty
Schedule Competitiveness
Schedule Certainty
Schedule Competitiveness
Schedule Competitiveness
Schedule Certainty
Schedule Certainty
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Quality
Safety
Safety
Project Functional
Objectives
Project Financial Objectives

Schedule Certainty
Safety
Safety
Project Functional
Objectives
Project Financial Objectives

Project Financial Objectives

Project Financial Objectives

External Stakeholder Impact
External Stakeholder Impact

External Stakeholder Impact
External Stakeholder Impact

Environmental
Environmental

Environmental

Change Management
Change Management
Change Management

Cost Certainty
Change Management
Change Management

Change Management
Change Management

Change Management
Change Management

Match





























Two of the KPIs (direct work rate and notice of violation) were categorized as “not
important” by more than 15% of the respondents. Upon recommendations from the
research team members, these two KPIs were removed from the PSF.
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The final PSF for industrial projects is presented in Table 4-6.
Table 4-6. Project Success Framework for Industrial Projects.
KRAs
Cost
Competitiveness

Cost Certainty

Schedule
Competitiveness

Schedule
Certainty

KPIs
Cost Efficiency

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦

Contingency Index

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡

Cost Variation
Schedule Efficiency
Buffer Index
Schedule Variation
QPR
Design defects

Quality
Construction defects
NCRs
Commissioning duration

Project Financial
Objectives

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∑𝑁 𝑥 𝑤
𝑥 200,000
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

TRIR

# 𝑂𝑆𝐻𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑥 200,000
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠

DART

# 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑥 200,000
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠

Safety

Project Functional
Objectives

Formula

Goal Achievement

1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved all of the functional objectives as
set out in the projects business case

Owner Financial
Objective Realization

1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved its financial objectives

Contractor Financial
Objective Realization

1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved its financial objectives

External
Stakeholder
Impacts

Complaints
External stakeholder
impact

1-7 Likert scale: This project had minimal impact to its external
stakeholders

Environmental
Impacts

Recordable
environmental events

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠

Change
Management

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡

Change cost index

𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡

Change time index

𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

# Non-owner changes

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠

# Owner Initiated
changes

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 / 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡

Speed of Change
Approval

Average duration that RFIs are open in weeks

a

The capacity of the facility should be a comparable industry metric for the facility (e.g. kWh, tonnes per day, bpd, etc.

b
c

The total project budget must include project contingency and be adjusted for scope changes.

The predicted project duration must include project buffers and be adjusted for scope changes.
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4.5

Discussion

The objective of this paper was to develop a framework that can evaluate the
effectiveness of collaborative project delivery methods for industrial projects. 11
KRAs were defined as essential outcomes that can be used to define the success of an
industrial project. Specific KPIs were also identified that can be used to consistently
measure the performance of a project in each of the 11 KRAs. The PSF was designed
to be flexible, so the KPIs that measure each KRA can change, enabling clients to
replace them with metrics that are important to their specific project, sector, or
business.
The KPIs also provide a specific way for clients to develop their non-cost incentive
mechanisms in the shared risk/reward commercial model. One of the time-consuming
activities associated with developing a collaborative contract is to identify suitable
metrics to incentivize performance. The PSF provides clients with a “menu” of KPIs
that can be used to develop these agreements.
4.5.1 Discussion of the KRAs
Two dimensions have consistently emerged from existing conceptual models of
project success. The first dimension pertains to the success of the management of the
project against predetermined targets: usually regarding cost, time, and quality. These
outcomes can be evaluated immediately after the conclusion of the project. In
Baccarini’s terms, this is “project management success”. The second dimension of
success relates to how well the project fulfils the client’s original need for the project.
This type of success must be evaluated at some time after the delivery of the project
and is referred to as “product success”.
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The 11 KRAs presented in the PSF can be separated into the project management and
product success dimensions. The PSF contains 9 KRAs that relate to project
management success and 2 KRAs that relates to product success, see Figure 4-2.

Figure 4-2. PSF KRAs separated into project management and product success
dimensions.
As Figure 4-2 shows, the PSF places greater emphasis on outcomes in the project
management dimension of overall project success. The PSF was developed with the
purpose of comparing the success of projects delivered under different delivery
methods. This indicates that project delivery methods have a greater influence over
project management outcomes, rather than how well a project achieves its client’s
organizational needs. This makes intuitive sense, as a project delivery method is, in
essence, the process by which a client realizes a project, not a way for clients to
identify projects that will fulfil their organizational needs.
Baccarini states that a project’s product success will trump its project management
success (Baccarini, 1999). In practical terms, this means that projects that meet all
their cost, schedule, and quality targets may still be considered a failure if they fail to
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meet their client’s long term organizational needs. Therefore, clients may be inclined
to evaluate the performance of a delivery method based on a project’s product
success. Doing so would be a mistake, as the delivery method has limited influence
over the project product success. This shows that clients need to consciously separate
project management and product outcomes when evaluating the performance of a
delivery method, and as Figure 4-2 shows, comparing delivery methods should focus
on comparing project management outcomes.
The PSF presents an alternative approach for evaluating a project’s cost and schedule
performance. Typically, cost and schedule performance relate to a project’s adherence
to its target budget and target finish date. This success framework separates cost and
schedule into their respective competitiveness and certainty. Practitioners provided
this recommendation because they said a project’s adherence to its targets is largely
dictated by how competitive those targets are. For example, a project could be
significantly under budget because of an inflated target budget. By separating a
project’s cost certainty from its cost competitiveness, clients gain a better
understanding of how successful their project was.
Another reason for separating cost and schedule certainty from competitiveness is
because it addresses an important criticism of collaborative delivery models. Under
the shared risk/reward commercial model, non-owner parties share in the underruns of
the project. This creates an implicit incentive to inflate the target cost (Henneveld,
2006; Thomsen, Darrington, Dunne, & Lichtig, 2016; Wood & Duffield, 2009). By
separating cost certainty from cost competitiveness, clients can increase their
visibility of the performance of a project and properly evaluate the effectiveness of
the delivery method.
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4.5.2 Discussion of the KPIs
The value of any comparison is dependent on the quality of information inputted into
the analysis. One of the issues present with existing project success frameworks is that
there is a lack of detailed instruction provided with their KPIs. For example, the
traditional cost variation KPI is present in many existing project success frameworks
(Chan, 2001; El Asmar et al., 2013, 2016; Franz, 2014; Hanna, 2016; KPI Working
Group, 2007). In these frameworks, the cost variation KPI is typically defined as:

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡

The issue with this formula is that it does not inform the individual providing
information on how to handle project change orders. Changes are a part of
construction and will appear on every project. Changes will occur for a number of
reasons, including differing ground conditions, inaccurate specifications, ownerinitiated design changes, or errors and omissions in the drawings. The initial budget in
this formula needs to reflect the cost of changes on the project. CII separates changes
into two categories: project development changes and scope changes. Project
development changes are defined as: “changes required to execute the original scope
of work or obtain original process basis”. Scope changes are defined as: “changes in
the base scope of work or process basis”. The PSF requires individuals to correct the
initial budget for scope changes but not project development related changes. Doing
so will better reflect the performance of the project team without distorting the cost
information because of changes. Additionally, this will ensure that the project
information being collected is consistent and thus will improve the accuracy of
comparisons that can be generated from the framework.
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The financial profitability indicator has been used a variety of existing frameworks;
however, its previous appearances usually only refer to the profitability of the client
(Chan, 2001; Nassar & AbouRizk, 2014). The PSF includes a KPI for the financial
performance of the contractor. This indicator helps to identify if a project was more
competitive because the work was delivered more efficiently, or if it was simply the
result of contractors reducing their profit margins.
4.5.3 Implications for Practitioners and Researchers
The benefits of the PSF are threefold. As intended, it provides clients with a
comprehensive list of KRAs and KPIs to compare the performance of a
collaboratively delivered project with one that is delivered under traditional methods.
This will enable clients to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of collaborative
delivery methods for industrial projects.
The PSF will also enable clients to make more informed decisions about the
application of all project delivery methods. Several efforts have been made to develop
project delivery method selection tools, such as the CIIs “Project Delivery and
Contracting Strategy” tool, and the United States Federal Highway “Contracting
Alternatives Suitability Evaluator”, but these tools continue to rely on judgement and
subjectivity to make their evaluations. The PSF provides clients with a structured
approach to evaluating the performance of their projects, and its adoption could help
to create a database used to inform future delivery method selection tools based on
sound empirical data, rather than subjective opinions.
Third, the PSF provides clients with a “menu” of KPIs that they can use to develop
their shared risk/reward commercial models. Collaborative delivery methods provide
clients with an opportunity to incentivize the achievement of their non-financial

83
objectives through KPIs. However, it can be challenging to measure performance in
outcomes other than cost. The PSF provides clients with a range of KPIs as well as
the KRA that they will each incentivize. This will help reduce the time spent
negotiating the metrics within the commercial model and ensure that their commercial
models incentivize behavior that promotes project success.
4.6

Conclusions

Collaborative project delivery methods are an outcome focused delivery method is
being adopted with the intent to deliver high risk industrial projects more effectively.
This paper developed and validated a Project Success Framework that will allow
researchers and practitioners to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of collaborative
delivery methods on important project outcomes for industrial capital projects. This
PSF also provides a structured approach to compare the performance of any project
delivery method across a varied spectrum of projects. Its adoption will enable
organizations to develop more accurate project delivery method selection tools that
use empirical evidence to determine when each delivery method would promote the
optimal results. Lastly, this framework will help clients develop their shared
risk/reward commercial models so that they incentivize behavior that promotes
successful outcomes.

84
5.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE
RESEARCH

Collaborative delivery methods present a fundamentally new way for clients to
deliver capital projects, and their recorded success on civil and healthcare projects has
gathered the attention of the industrial sector. Prior research has found strong interest
within the industrial sector for using a delivery system that is more collaborative and
that aligns the commercial outcomes of all the participants (CII RT-271, 2012). To
address this demand, this thesis provides three papers that each address an issue with
the adoption of collaborative delivery methods in the industrial sector. In combination
these papers will facilitate with the industrial sectors inevitable transition to
collaborative delivery of their capital projects. The conclusions from each paper are
presented below.
5.1

Conclusions

Existing knowledge on the types of projects that suit collaborative delivery methods
lack definition and consistency. Chapter 2 brought much needed clarity to the body of
knowledge on this topic. Interviews revealed that projects with high uncertainty in
their outcomes are best suited for collaborative delivery. This was validated through a
web-based questionnaire of industrial projects which found that projects with greater
risk were employing more C.I. methods and principles. This understanding will help
clients in the industrial sector identify projects that will have the greatest likelihood of
being successful under this new delivery method.
Chapter 2 also found evidence to suggest that, unlike current guidelines recommend, a
project’s complexity is not a good indicator of its suitability for collaborative
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delivery. The web-based questionnaire also revealed that industrial projects with
higher dollar value employ more collaborative and integrated practices.
Chapter 3 presented a detailed overview of the shared risk/reward commercial model
and explored the lessons learned about each of its components. The findings of the
interviews revealed several lessons that will help clients in the industrial sector
understand the implications of these commercial terms and help them to develop their
own commercial agreements.
The adoption of collaborative project delivery methods in the industrial sector
remains low, but there is significant interest to move in a more collaborative direction.
As clients begin to experiment, there will be a need to evaluate the performance of
projects delivered under collaborative systems to those delivered under traditional
systems. Without the ability to make this comparison, there will be no compelling
evidence to drive change throughout the sector. Chapter 4 addresses this need by
developing a project success framework that gives clients a structured approach to
comparing the performance of their industrial projects delivered under different
delivery methods.
The project success framework identified the following 11 Key Result Areas that
clients should evaluate when comparing the performance of projects delivered under
different delivery methods:
1. Cost Certainty

2. Project Functional Objectives

3. Cost Competitiveness

4. Project Financial Objectives

5. Schedule Certainty

6. External Stakeholder Impact

7. Schedule Competitiveness

8. Environmental Impacts

9. Quality

10. Change Management

11. Safety
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In addition to the KRAs, Chapter 4 presents a list of KPIs that can be used by clients
to develop their shared risk/reward commercial model. This list of KPIs will ensure
that clients are incentivizing behavior that supports their desired outcomes.
5.2

Limitations

The findings of this study are subject to several limitations. Those limitations include
the following:


In Chapter 2, no relationship was found between complexity or schedule
compression and the number of C.I. methods and principles on industrial
projects. It is possible that the operationalization of these variables introduced
error into the analysis and confounded the results.



The sample size of the semi structured interviews used in Chapter 3 was
limited. However, the population of projects delivered under collaborative
delivery methods is small, and the population of senior management that are
familiar with the commercial terms is even smaller. Additionally, this sample
size was similar to other construction management research where the
population investigated is small (Beckman-Cross, 2016; Love et al., 2011).



In Chapter 3, there was also no representation of practitioners that had
experience with the IPD delivery method in the sample of interviewees.
Collaborative delivery methods encompass the IPD delivery method and
including a participant with IPD experience would have provided a more
complete perspective.



The project success framework was developed with the intent of being
applicable to all industrial projects. There may be limitations to this
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generalizability because the group of professionals used to develop the project
success framework may not have been representative of the entire industrial
sector. Additionally, there was no representation of contractors during the
development of this framework. With that being said, contractors were part of
the targeted survey which validated the framework, mitigating this limitation.
5.3

Directions for Future Research

The findings of Chapter 2 revealed that projects with high uncertainty in their
outcomes are good candidates for collaborative delivery methods. Currently, there is
no consistent approach to evaluate a project’s uncertainty. Future research should
develop a reliable measure of this variable because it will enable clients to
consistently evaluate their projects suitability for collaborative project delivery.
Interviewees suggested that the source of uncertainty differs between projects in the
civil and healthcare industries. Future research should compare the different sources
of uncertainty between these industries as it could help to explain differences found
between the IPD and alliancing agreements. Such a finding could help inform the
optimal structure of collaborative agreements in the industrial sector.
This research was unable to conclude a minimum project value needed to support
collaborative project delivery methods. One avenue for future research would be to
compare how the costs vary between projects delivered with collaborative delivery
methods to those delivered under traditional delivery methods. This may be able to
reveal the cost of setting up and running a collaboratively delivered project and could
help determine if a minimum project value is needed to support this delivery method.
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A lesson learned identified in Chapter 3 was that the use of a sub-alliance was a
leading reason for the failure of one alliance in New Zealand. More research is needed
to inform project teams on the implications of entering a sub-alliance agreement.
Once the industrial sector has increased its adoption of collaborative delivery methods
there will be a need to research and publish the performance of these delivery
methods as they compare to traditional delivery methods, as this will help with the
widespread adoption of this new delivery system. The project success framework can
be used to help guide this research.
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Hello, my name is Xavier Wood, and I am a master’s student at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. Thank you for taking the time to talk to me today about your
experience with Alliancing. If there is any question that you do not feel comfortable
answering, or that does not apply to you, just let me know, and we will move on.
As this is a research project, we do require you to provide informed consent. [Give
them the informed consent form.] This form includes information about the project
overall, potential risks, and rewards, and what will be done with the data. [Go over
each section, if needed.] We plan to record this interview, for later transcription and
analysis, so there is also a permission to record checkbox.
Do you have any questions for me?
1. Participant Information
a. How many years’ experience do you have in your industry?
b. How many alliance projects have you executed / worked with?
c. What is the role of your organization?
d. What is your position in your organization?
2. This section seeks to understand what type of project would be a good
candidate for collaborative project delivery. Four variables are discussed.
a. Risk
i. Literature often states that alliancing is good for projects with
high risk
ii. Do you agree?
iii. If yes, what exactly is meant by the term risk?
iv. [Present risk events and project risk concept] Does your
conceptualization of risk relate to risk events or project risk?
v. Are there specific risks that lend toward collaborative delivery?
b. Complexity
i. Literature often states that alliancing is good for projects that
are highly complex
ii. Do you agree?
iii. If yes, what exactly do you mean by complexity?
c. Tight time frame
i. Literature often states that alliancing is good for projects with
tight time frames
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ii. Do you agree?
iii. Can you describe how alliancing reduces overall project
delivery duration?
d. Project Value
i. Alliancing guidelines often recommend that this delivery
method is reserved for projects over $100M.
ii. Do you agree?
iii. If yes, why must projects have a minimum value?
3. This section seeks to understand your experience with the shared risk/reward
commercial model. Questions are asked about each component in the
commercial model.
a. Pain/gain
i. Was the pain/gain mechanism a primary driver of different
behavior?
ii. How did the pain/gain compare to the non-cost KPIs in terms
of how they changed behavior?
iii. Is there anything you would change with the pain/gain
mechanism?
b. NOP risk cap
i. What are your thoughts on capping NOPS downside risk?
ii. Is there anything you would change with the NOP risk cap
mechanism?
c. KPIs
i. Would you change any of the non-cost KPIs used on alliance
projects you have been involved with?
d. KRA Pool
i. Is there a minimum value needed to incentivize NOPs to pursue
the KRA pool?
e. Who to include in the agreement
i. What parties should be included in the shared risk/reward
agreement?
ii. How should a client decide which parties to include?
4. Do you know of any other individuals that would be willing to speak with me
about their experience on the alliance delivery method?

Those are all the questions we have for you. Thank you again for speaking to me!

100
APPENDIX C.

C.I. PRINCIPLES DEFINITIONS

Collaboration and Integration Principles
Continuous
communication and
issue resolution
Jointly developed
and validated targets
Access to shared
information systems
Early involvement of
stakeholders
Collaborative and
equitable decision
making
Financial
transparency among
key participants
Shared risk and
reward
Relational
contracting (multiparty agreement)
Negotiated risk
distribution

A set of procedures that aims for the team parties to communicate
throughout the entire project and consists of identifying and resolving
issues, action planning, and follow-up agreements.
A process that aims for the members on the project team to define and
confirm project targets and objectives throughout the term of the project.
A system setup to allow for sharing of project information such as
documents and models.
A process that allows key parties such as the owner, contractor, engineer(s),
and major subs to be present and involved from the earliest design phases
of the project.
A process that aims for all members on the project team to collaborate on
all project decisions throughout the project and to have an equal opinion on
such decisions.
An agreement where financial information such as the project budget is
shared among key project participants.
A process that allows for team members to combine the risk and rewards of
the project and incentivize collaboration in order to reach common project
goals.
An agreement where there is one contract between the project team. The
contract can include owner, architect, general contractor, and other parties
that have a primary role in the project.
A document that specifies that there should be no litigation or arbitration
between key participants and failure of this is not entitled to incentives or
reimbursement.
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C.I. METHODS DEFINITIONS

Collaboration and Integration Methods
Alternate Scheduling
Method (Pull
Planning)
Co-location (Big
Room)
Constructability
Planning in Design
Phase
Formal Partnering
and/or Team
Building

Front End Planning
(PDRI)
Joint Risk
Assessment Tool

Multi-party
Agreement

Multi-party Project
Management Team

Mutual Liability
Waivers

No Dispute Charter
Preassembly or
Modular
Construction
Quality
Improvement
Process
Rapid Process
Improvement
Workshops
Contract Incentives
(Shared Risk and
Reward)

A plan for executing a specific phase of a project by using a "pull"
technique to determine project hand-offs. The plan is prepared through a
conversation by the team responsible for doing the work. Work is planned
at the request of a downstream customer.
An organizational placement strategy where project team members are
physically located close to one another to improve communications,
working relationships, and productivity.
The optimal use of construction knowledge and experience in planning,
design, procurement, and field operations in order to achieve overall project
objectives by improving means and methods and enhancing design intent.
A project-focused process that builds and develops shared goals,
interdependence, trust, commitment, and accountability, and improves team
members’ problem-solving skills. Partnering can be further defined as a
structured sequence of principles initiated at the start of the project, based
on mutual objectives, that applies specific tools and techniques (e.g.,
conflict resolution techniques) to achieve the agreed-upon performance
metrics of the project.
The process of developing sufficient strategic information for owners to
address risk and make decisions about committing resources to maximize
the potential for a successful project.
It is used by the owner, contractor, and designer to collaboratively identify,
evaluate, and estimate the levels of risks involved on a project and
determine an acceptable level of risk.
An approach that uses one contractor for the entire project, often entered in
by the owner, designer, general contractor, and any other party who may
have a primary role in the project. Including all key participants in the
contract and agreeing to the same terms and conditions enables participants
to understand each other's roles, responsibilities, and risk.
The key decision-making body for the project, responsible for providing
leadership and governance, ensures that the obligations of the participants
are fulfilled and the owner's objectives are achieved
A contracting mechanism that intends to reduce liability exposure for key
project stakeholders. Can include simple waivers of consequential damages
to prevent the owner, contractor, or designer from seeking damages for
delay, or can include a more comprehensive approach to include project
performance, builder's risk, and third-party claims.
An agreement that there should be no litigation or arbitration between key
participants, and that project failure does not entitle any participant to
reimbursement.
The use of offsite construction to prepare elements of a structure, often as
modules to be assembled on site. Includes all substantial construction and
assembly components and areas of the finished project.
Often referred to as “Six Sigma,” a quality process that uses techniques to
eliminate process variation. A statistical measure used to measure the
performance of processes or products against customer requirements.
A lean tool commonly referred to as "Kaizen" during construction and
design charrette during design. The workshop brings line workers into
decision processes for improvements and focuses on making quick, feasible
changes.
Incentives written in the contract combine the risks and rewards of all team
members and incentivize the achievement of common project goals.
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Standardized Design
Techniques
Design to Cost
(Target Value
Design)
Use of Technology as
an Integration Tool

Value Engineering
Value Streaming
Mapping
Advanced Work
Packaging

A3 Decision Making

An attempt to design elements of a facility in a consistent manner in order
to promote repetition, increase productivity, and reduce field errors.
It aims to increase the value delivered to the owner by collaboratively
designing against a detailed estimate that is based on a given cost, often the
owner's allocable cost. Ultimately, the design follows this allowable cost.
A combination of the design, fabrication information, erection instructions,
and project management logistics in one database. Provides a platform for
collaboration throughout a project's design and construction. BIM is an
example of how technology can be used to integrate project information.
An organized approach to analyzing designed building features, systems,
equipment, and material selections. Aims to achieve essential functions at
the lowest lifecycle cost while remaining consistent with performance,
quality, and reliability, and safety requirements.
Mapping all steps in project delivery, including the flow of materials and
information. Improves the production process by identifying unnecessary
steps and improving the project team's understanding of the process.
An overall process flow of all the detailed work packages. It is a planned
executable process that encompasses the work on an engineering,
procurement, and construction project, beginning with initial planning and
continuing through detailed design and construction execution.
Also referred as A3 problem solving, it is a structured problem-solving and
continuous improvement approach. It provides a simple and strict
procedure that guides problem solving by workers. The approach typically
uses a single sheet of ISO A3-size paper.
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RISK ITEM EXAMPLE RISKS

Risk Item

Specific Risk Events

Funding





Inflation
Escalation of material prices
Change in project funding sources

Geotechnical and
Subsurface




Ground conditions different than what was anticipated
Unforeseen utilities discovered

Environmental





Delayed permit approvals
Changes in environmental regulations
Protected flora and fauna

Design





Design errors and omissions
Poor constructability of designs
Poor operational functionality of designs

Weather



Adverse weather conditions












Construction quality issues
Safety incidents
Low labor and equipment productivity
Low availability of skilled labor
Poor construction trade coordination
Inaccurate cost estimates
Low availability of equipment and materials
Unanticipated design or engineering changes
Change order negotiations
Scope Creep

Political and Community




Public groups opposed to project
Political groups opposed to project

Land Acquisition



Delays in acquisition of land

Organizational





Poor communication between key project participants
Loss of key project personnel
Financial failure of project participants

Construction

Scope Change
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Project Sector
Heavy Industrial

Light Industrial

Infrastructure

Buildings

CII PROJECT SECTOR BREAKDOWN

Types of Projects


















Upstream Oil and Gas
Refining and Petrochemical
Mining and Metals
Pulp and Paper
Power Generation
Gas Processing
Automotive Manufacturing
Pharmacy and Biotech
Consumer Products (Food and Beverage)
Power transmission
Pipelines
Transportation
Water and Wastewater
Healthcare
Commercial
Office
Schools
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PREVIOUS MODELS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
KPI working group’s model of success

KRA
Client
Satisfaction
Defects

Cost

KPI

Measurement

Satisfaction with Product

1 – 10 Likert Scale

Satisfaction with Service

1 – 10 Likert Scale

Impact of Defects at
Handover

1 – 10 Likert Scale

Design Cost Growth

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡

Construction Cost Growth

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡

Total Cost Growth

Time

Safety
Profitability

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡

Design Schedule Growth

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Construction Schedule
Growth

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟. 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Total Schedule Growth

𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Lost Time Incidents

# 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑥 200,000
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠

Project Profit

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑥 100
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒

Franz’s model of project success
KRA

KPI
Unit Cost

Cost

Cost Growth
Intensity
Schedule Growth

Schedule

Delivery Speed
Construction Speed

Quality of Building
Systems

Measurement
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Quality of envelope and
structure

1 – 6 Likert Scale

Quality of interior finishes

1 – 6 Likert Scale

Quality of environmental
systems

1 – 6 Likert Scale
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Difficulty of facility start up

Facility Turnover

Number and magnitude of call
backs
Operation and maintenance
costs

1 – 6 Likert Scale
1 – 6 Likert Scale
1 – 6 Likert Scale

The model of project success developed by El Asmar et al.
KRA

KPI

Measurement

Return Business

1 – 5 Likert Scale

Customer Relations
Claims
OSHA Recordables

Safety
Lost Time Injuries
Construction Speed
Delivery Speed

Schedule
Intensity
Schedule Growth
Unit Cost

Cost
Cost Growth

Quality

Communication and
Collaboration

# 𝑂𝑆𝐻𝐴 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑥 1,000,000
$ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
# 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑥 1,000,000
$ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡

Systems Quality

1 – 5 Likert Scale

Deficiency Issues

1 – 5 Likert Scale

Punchlist Items

1 – 5 Likert Scale

Warranty Costs

0 – 2 Ordinal scale

Cost of Latent Defects

Financial

Binary scale

Binary scale

Profit

0 – 3 Ordinal scale

RFIs

# 𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑠
𝑥 1,000,000
$ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒

RFI Processing Time
Rework
Resubmittals

Average RFI processing time in weeks
0 – 4 Ordinal scale
# 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠
𝑥 1,000,000
$ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
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Total Changes
Change Order Processing
Time
Percent Plan Complete
Trend

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒

Average change order processing time in
weeks
-1 – 1 Nominal Scale

108
APPENDIX H.

INITIAL LIST OF KPIS DEVELOPED DURING THE

RESEARCH CHARRETTE
KRAs

KPIs
Cost Efficiency

Cost
Competitiveness

Direct Work Rate
Productivity
Contingency
Index

Cost Certainty

Schedule
Competitiveness

Schedule
Certainty

Cost Variation
Schedule
Efficiency
Buffer Index
Schedule
Variation

Formula
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
# 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∑𝑁 𝑥 𝑤
𝑥 200,000
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠

QPR

Quality

Design defects
Construction
defects
NCRs
Commissioning
duration

Project Financial
Objectives

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

TRIR

# 𝑂𝑆𝐻𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑥 200,000
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠

DART

# 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑥 200,000
# 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠

Safety

Project
Functional
Objectives

Where,
N = # of unplanned quality events (variation, defect or failure)
W = weighted severity level of each event

Goal
Achievement

1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved all of the functional objectives
as set out in the projects business case

Owner Financial
Objective
Realization

1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved its financial objectives

Contractor
Financial
Objective
Realization

1-7 Likert scale: This project achieved its financial objectives
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External
Stakeholder
Impacts

Environmental
Impacts

Change
Management

Complaints

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡

External
stakeholder
impact

External stakeholders could include: local businesses in surrounding
area, local residents, other divisions at a facility during a renovation.

Recordable
environmental
events
EPA Notice of
Violation

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

Change cost
index

𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡

Change time
index

𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

# Non-owner
changes

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠

# Owner Initiated
changes

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 / 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡

Speed of Change
Approval

# of days between RFI request and closure

